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This study investigates the impact of settlement announcements between international banks and 
regulators on the short-term stock market performance of the banks. Recurring to event study 
methodology, this analysis is focused in settlements larger than USD 100 million. The dataset is 
comprised of penalties imposed on 25 financial institutions indentified as Global Systemically 
Important Banks (G-SIBs), totaling 141 events from 2010 to February 2017. Results for the full 
sample show significant positive abnormal returns for different periods surrounding the event. 
Significant positive abnormal returns on the day before the announcement for non-USA banks 
suggest leakage of information before the information is made public. Regarding USA banks the 
market response, although positive, seems to be slightly delayed. The positive abnormal returns 
indicate that investors are pleased that litigation cases are concluded and that the terms of deals 
are better than expected. Partial tax deduction of financial penalties also contributes to the 
positive reaction. Analysis of the determinants of abnormal returns supports these arguments and 
reveals that investors penalize less efficient banks. Lastly, settlements involving payments with 
compensatory nature and violation of sanctions are particularly well received by the market and 
















ABSTRACT (portuguese version) 
Este estudo investiga o impacto que a divulgação de settlements entre bancos internacionais e 
reguladores tem na performance a curto prazo das ações dos bancos em bolsa. Recorrendo à 
metodologia de event studies, esta análise foca-se em settlements superiores a USD 100 milhões. 
Os dados utilizados consistem em multas impostas a 25 instituições financeiras identificadas 
como Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), totalizando 141 eventos desde 2010 até 
fevereiro de 2017. Os resultados para a amostra total mostram retornos anormais positivos 
significantes para períodos diferentes em torno do evento. Retornos anormais positivos 
significantes no dia anterior à divulgação para bancos não americanos sugerem a existência de 
fuga de informação antes da mesma ser tornada pública. Em relação a bancos americanos, a 
reação do mercado, embora positiva, parece ocorrer com algum atraso. Os retornos anormais 
positivos indicam que os investidores ficam agradados com a conclusão de litígios e que os 
termos acordados são mais vantajosos do que o esperado. A dedução parcial das multas para fins 
de impostos também contribui para a reação positiva. A análise aos determinantes dos retornos 
anormais sustenta estes argumentos e revela que os investidores penalizam bancos menos 
eficientes. Por último, settlements que envolvam pagamentos de natureza compensatória e 
violação de sanções são particularmente bem recebidos pelo mercado e levam a retornos 
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The main purpose of this study is to extend prior research on corporate misconduct in the 
financial sector, by examining stock market reaction after public disclosure of settlements (and 
correspondent financial penalties) between banks and regulators that result in the conclusion of 
unsolved litigation. Different phases during corporate ligation could trigger different short-term 
market reactions. Previous research has shown that allegations of corporate misconduct lead to 
significant declines in the equity value of firms, as investors anticipate potential losses arising 
from litigation and reputational costs. With ongoing litigation, uncertainty about the final 
outcome is always present. This uncertainty leads investors to fear additional litigation-related 
costs and new enforcement actions being brought up against the firm by regulators. In fact, the 
uncertainty only vanishes when the case ends, usually under the form of a settlement or 
judgment. At this stage, several factors might prompt a positive reaction from investors (e.g. final 
outcome is known and firms get off lightly). 
Using event study methodology, I investigate whether the announcement of settlements with 
regulatory agencies (in some cases private entities) has a significant impact on the market value 
of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). Assuming that markets are efficient in the 
sense that all publicly available information is reflected in stock prices, if settlement 
announcements convey unexpected information, investors should react and stock prices will be 
affected. If this is verified, settlement announcements are considered informative. Additionally, 
in order to understand in more detail and explain the results of the event study, I study the cross-
sectional information content of settlement announcements by analyzing if certain bank-specific 
and settlement-specific variables influence investors’ reaction upon the announcement of 
resolution of litigation. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 highlights the concepts behind 
misconduct and reputational risk. In Section 3 research related to this study is discussed. In 
Section 4 the methodology used throughout the study is provided. In Section 5 I describe the data 
used in the study and elaborate on how the dataset was created. Additionally, due to lack of 
research on this subject an overview of financial penalty trends is provided for banks in the 




2. Misconduct and reputational risk 
Misconduct risk in banking has been growing consistently after the 2007-2009 global financial 
crisis because of stricter rules on financial intermediation and increased scrutiny by customers 
and regulators (Resti, 2017). Despite its harmful impact on both the financial stability of the 
banking sector and the real economy, misconduct risk does not have a single, precise definition. 
According to the European Banking Authority (EBA), misconduct risk is defined as “the current 
or prospective risk of losses to an institution arising from an inappropriate supply of financial 
services, including cases of willful or negligent misconduct” (European Banking Authority, 2016, 
p. 89).  
Misconduct in banks may damage confidence in the financial system, which has been weakened 
since the emergence of the aforementioned financial crisis. Regulators and supervisors must 
ensure that banks are stable and safe, making the execution of enforcement actions an important 
tool that allows them to sanction banks whenever they violate safe banking practices or the law is 
broken. Ex post penalties in the form of fines are the most common determent method of 
regulators. They rely on the discouraging effect of a pecuniary fine, in addition to a reputational 
cost (Carletti, 2017). This is an important feature of banking supervision, since due to opaqueness 
of bank business models (Morgan, 2002), regulators must have clearer information than market 
participants.  
While financial penalties rightly serve as a correcting mechanism, in certain cases, they may 
entail systemic risks and have a counterproductive effect for financial stability (European 
Systemic Risk Board, 2015). In fact, the European Banking Authority introduced in 2014, for the 
first time, costs related to misconduct risk in its EU-wide stress tests. Still, Köster and Pelster 
(2017) point out that for some commentators these litigation costs are just another cost of doing 
business. According to a report elaborated by The Boston Consulting Group (BCG), banks across 
the world have paid around USD 321 billion since 2009, and while U.S. regulators have been 
more effective in imposing penalties and recovering fines, their counterparts in Europe and Asia 
are likely to step up pace (The Boston Consulting Group, 2017). 
Misconduct risk and reputational risk go hand in hand as reputational costs are usually a 
consequence of misconduct. Reputational risk is the “risk arising from negative perception on the 
part of customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors, debt-holders, market analysts, other 
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relevant parties or regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or 
establish new, business relationships and continued access to sources of funding” (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2009, p. 19). In sum, reputational risk is any risk that can potentially 
damage the status of an organization in the eyes of third-parties. Reputational costs arise because 
of the weakened confidence of stakeholders, which can be manifested, for example, in lower 
sales by a firm that engages in consumer fraud or unfavorable changes in the terms of trade with 
suppliers when a firm cheats in its commercial transactions (Murphy et al., 2009). 
3. Literature review  
In an institutional context, a firm’s choice to engage in erratic behaviors (i.e. misconduct) is the 
same as any other business decision (Simpson, 2002). Yet, the potential losses stemming from its 
detection should be weighed against the potential economic gains in case of impunity. According 
to Murphy et al. (2009) potential losses include costs resulting from litigation and reputational 
costs. 
There is a considerable vast literature dealing with cross-industry firms accused of misconduct 
acts and the correspondent impact on the stock price. Karpoff and Lott (1993) were some of the 
first conducting research in this topic, and they analyze the market impact that firms experience 
after the initial press announcement that they are facing criminal charges. In a sample consisting 
of 132 corporate frauds from 1978 to 1987, the authors find that alleged or actual fraud 
announcements of stakeholders or the government correspond to significant losses in the accused 
firm’s common stock market value, with average abnormal declines of 1.3% and 5.1% 
respectively. They also find that around 6.5% is explained by penalties and legal fees, with the 
remaining loss being explained by reputational damages. Other studies present similar results 
(Alexander, 1999; Bhagat et al., 1994; Murphy et al., 2009; Reichert et al., 1996 Skantz et al., 
1990).  
With respect to short-term returns, it is not surprising that the first public disclosure of a firm’s 
misconduct should have a negative effect on the stock price, as shareholders anticipate the 
monetary losses that might emerge, such as financial penalties and legal costs, and also the 
resultant reputational damage (Haslem, 2005). Nonetheless, different events during corporate 
litigation could cause different reactions. The settlement or judgment is a crucial event in 
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corporate litigation, since only at this point the precise information about the extent of wrongful 
activities is publicly disclosed. Although it is likely that information about the misconduct has 
surfaced before the date of the settlement or judgment, there is uncertainty about its 
trustworthiness and whether if such information is definitive or not.  
Köster and Pelster (2017) argue that upon a settlement or judgment a positive effect on the stock 
price is expected for several reasons. The resolution of litigation concludes a dispute, eliminates 
the uncertainty about the final outcome and puts an end to the costs arising from the negative 
media coverage of the process. A positive market reaction might also indicate that investors 
realize that firms get off lightly, as financial penalties might be small, when weighted against the 
realized gains accrued from the misbehavior or the provisions set aside. Additionally, the 
resolution of unsolved litigation and the correspondent financial penalties might also promote a 
change towards more elaborate governance mechanisms and contribute to more responsible 
practices by the management (Agrawal et al., 1999). In particular, settlements should be seen as 
good news for shareholders of the accused firms and as the optimal solution in litigation cases, 
because they reduce the risk of larger financial penalties when resolution is achieved through a 
judgment (Haslem, 2005). 
Some authors have studied the short-term market reaction after settlement announcements but 
there is disparity among the results. Contrary to what would be expected, Haslem (2005) detects 
negative abnormal returns after a settlement is announced, and argues that self-interest prompts 
managers to settle at higher values even when it could be more benefic for shareholders not 
reaching a settlement. Other studies find a negative or insignificant effect of the settlement on 
stock prices (Karpoff and Lott, 1993, 1999). Conversely, Bhagat et al. (1994) and Koku and 
Qureshi (2006) find short-term positive abnormal returns. 
When focusing only in the financial industry, the number of research investigating the impact of 
misconduct-related issues on the market value of banks is somewhat limited and scarcer than 
expected. Studies by Cummins et al. (2006), De Fontnouvelle and Perry (2005), and Gillet et al. 
(2010) analyze the reputational loss that financial companies experience after unexpected 
operational losses. De Fontnouvelle and Perry (2005) examine reputational damage following 
operational loss announcements for a sample of 115 worldwide listed banks from 1974 to 2004. 
The authors show that the announcement date has a significant, negative impact on the stock 
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price of the banks and that the reputational effect, measured by the difference of market value 
loss and the operational loss (relative to the market value), is larger when the operational loss is 
due to internal fraud. Cummins et al. (2006) perform a similar analysis for 403 listed USA banks 
and 89 listed USA insurance companies between 1978 and 2003, considering operational loss 
announcements larger than USD 10 million. They find that both types of firms experience 
significant negative price reactions with market value drops exceeding the amount of the 
operational losses. However, banks experience smaller negative impacts and the reputational 
effect is larger for high growth firms (measured by high Tobin Qs). Gillet et al. (2010) investigate 
the market reaction after the announcement of operational losses larger than USD 10 million for 
152 financial companies listed in Europe and USA between 1990 and 2004. For each operational 
loss, key dates are defined and analyzed: the first press announcement, the recognition by the 
targeted company, and the settlement date. The authors discover significant negative abnormal 
returns around the first press date, while around the settlement date (when it differs from the two 
other dates) significant positive abnormal returns are detected. They also find that internal frauds 
trigger larger abnormal returns, and that USA financial companies suffer larger reputational 
losses than their European counterparts. Finally, Köster and Pelster (2017) examine the impact of 
financial penalties on banks’ market value and profitability. Their sample is comprised of 68 
financial institutions from 20 different countries and only settlements or judgments higher than 
USD 10 million are considered. The authors find significant positive abnormal returns in the 
period surrounding the announcement of the settlement or judgment, and also in the one-year 
buy-and-hold returns. The arguments used to explain such reaction are: 1) improvement of the 
managers’ behavior and cessation of erratic behaviors after the payment of a fine; 2) investors’ 
sense of relief due to the magnitude of the penalty (when weighted against the economic gain 
achieved through misconduct); 3) partial tax deductibility of some financial penalties, partly 
offsetting their negative impact in banks’ results
1
; 4) elimination of uncertainty associated with 
pending litigation and cessation of negative media coverage. 
                                                             




4.1 Event study methodology synthesis 
An event study measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm (Mackinlay, 1997). 
More specifically, using this method, one can determine whether there is an abnormal stock price  
effect associated with an unanticipated event – that is, if the returns were different from those that 
would be considered appropriate (or normal), given a certain model used to obtain theoretically 
adequate returns. Studies by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) introduced the 
standard methodology that continues to be used today. Since analyzing each event individually is 
not very informative, the key focus is to measure the sample securities’ mean and cumulative 
mean abnormal returns around the time of an event (Khotari and Warner, 2006).  
While there is not a single defined structure for conducting event studies, there is a general flow 
of analysis. Mackinlay (1997) summarizes the procedure in seven steps: 
First, it is mandatory to define what constitutes the event of interest and the period over which the 
security prices of the firms involved will be analyzed. This period is known as the event window. 
The second step consists in determining the selection criteria for the inclusion of a given firm in 
the study.  Third, it is required to define and calculate the normal and abnormal returns (ARs) for 
each individual event. Several models can be used to calculate the normal returns (e.g. Market 
Model, Fama-French three Factor Model). After selecting which model to generate normal 
returns, the estimation window needs to be defined. This is the period over which the parameters 
of the model are estimated. Typically, the estimation window precedes the event window, so that 
the event does not influence the normal performance model estimates. This is the fourth step. 
Then, abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) can be calculated in the event window.  
The fifth step is defining the testing framework for ARs and CARs. Important considerations are 
defining the null hypothesis and determining the techniques for aggregating the ARs. Several 
tests (parametric and non-parametric) can be used to access the statistical significance of ARs. 
However, the quality of test statistics is related to the characteristics of the data. Deviations of 
these characteristics from those required by statistical theory will worsen the quality of the test 
statistics. So, researchers must understand the statistical assumptions inherent to different tests 
and their limitations when hypothesis testing. 
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Common issues highlighted and examined by the literature are summarized by Binder (1998): 1) 
cross-sectional correlation (in event time) of abnormal returns estimators (particularly severe 
when all firms belong to the same industry or when there is event clustering; 2) heterogeneity of 
the abnormal return estimators variance; 3) serial correlation of abnormal return estimators for 
individual firms; 4) abnormal return estimators have greater variance during the event-period 
(also known as event-induced variance). While researchers must be aware of these specific 
characteristics, often many of the problems can simply be ignored, because, in practice, they are 
quite minor (Binder, 1998). 
The sixth step is the presentation of empirical results, and the last step is interpretation of the 
results and conclusions obtained. 
4.2 Defining events 
Events are only considered when they have a final character, that is, when there is a settlement 
announcement. When there is more than one settlement on the same date for the same bank, 
penalties are added, constructing what I call aggregate financial penalties. Each aggregate 
financial penalty corresponds to one event and the minimum amount for inclusion is USD 100 
million. In total, there are 195 individual financial penalties and 149 aggregate financial 
penalties. However, the number of events reduces to 141 due to the existence of concurring 
events. 
4.3 Constructing abnormal returns 
First, individual daily continuously compounded stock returns are calculated from closing prices 
(adjusted for capital events) retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream database. Each daily 
return is calculated from the previous day with a non-missing price and trading volume to the 
current day, using the following formula: 
 
       
   
     
  (1) 
where     is the daily continuously compounded return for stock   on day  ,     is the adjusted 
closing price for stock   on day t, and       is the adjusted closing price for stock   on day    . 
ARs are the actual returns of securities over the event window minus the normal, or expected, 
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returns over the event window. The normal returns are defined as the expected returns if no event 
had taken place. For each sample security  , the abnormal return at time   relative to the event is:  
               (2) 
where      is the abnormal return,      is the actual return, and      is the normal return (given 
by a particular model of expected returns). 
To calculate the ARs for each event, as in previous studies, the market model is used. The market 
model is a statistical model that relates the return of a security to the return of the market 
portfolio, as expressed in the following equation: 
                  (3) 
where     is the stock return of the  
th
 bank on day  ,     is the return of a market index on day  , 
    is the zero mean error term,    is a parameter that measures the sensitivity of     to the market 
index, and    is a parameter that represents the idiosyncratic risk component of bank   stock. The 
abnormal return of bank   stock on day   is estimated as the residual    , and is defined as: 
                     (4) 
In addition to the market model, a two-index model is also used to generate the abnormal returns. 
In this model, besides the standard market factor, it is also included an industry factor. The MSCI 
World Banks Index is chosen to proxy for the banking industry. This index is composed of large 
and mid cap stocks across 23 developed markets countries
2
. All securities are classified in the 
Banks industry group according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). The 
model is expressed as follows: 
                            (5) 
where     is the stock return of the  
th
 bank on day  ,     is the return of a market index on day  , 
     is the return of the banking industry index on day  ,     is the zero mean error term,    is a 
                                                             
2 Developed Markets countries include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, U.K, and USA. 
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parameter that measures the sensitivity of     to the market index,       is a parameter that 
measures the sensitivity of     to the banking industry index, and    is a parameter that represents 
the idiosyncratic risk component of bank   stock. The abnormal return of bank   stock on day   is 
estimated as the residual    , and is defined as: 
                               (6) 
Lastly, for robustness of results, the Carhart (1997) four-factor model is also used to generate 
abnormal returns. This model is an extension of the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model 
(Fama and French, 1993), and is defined as follows: 
                                                 (7) 
where     is the stock excess return of the  
th
 bank on day  ,     is the return of a market index 
on day  ,      is the average return on three small market capitalization portfolios minus the 
average return on three large market capitalization portfolios,      is the average return on two 
high book-to-market equity portfolios minus the average return on two low book-to-market 
equity portfolios,      is the average return on two high prior return portfolios minus the 
average return on two low prior return portfolios,     is the zero mean error term,     is a 
parameter that measures the sensitivity of     to the market index,       is a parameter that 
measures the sensitivity of     to the size factor,       is a parameter that measures the 
sensitivity of     to the value factor,       is a parameter that measures the sensitivity of     to 
the momentum factor, and    is a parameter that represents the idiosyncratic risk component of 
bank   stock. The abnormal return of bank   stock on day   is estimated as the residual    , and is 
defined as: 
                                                    (8) 
The indexes and datasets used per country for each return generating model are shown in 
Appendix 1. The parameters in equations (3), (5) and (7) are estimated via Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) over a specific estimation window. While there is no consensus in the literature 
regarding the length that should be used, the use of daily rather than monthly return data has 
become more prevalent (Khotari and Warner, 2006). One year of daily observations is used, that 
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is, 250 trading days. To check if results are dependent on estimation window length, 200 and 150 
trading days are also used (not reported). Considering     the event day, parameters are 
estimated for the following estimation windows: (-251, -2); (-201, -2); (-151, -2). Abnormal 
returns are calculated for each day of the (-1, 1) window. The chosen event window is short on 
purpose, since it only includes the day preceding the event, the event day and the day after the 
event. Nonetheless, it allows one to analyze possible leakage of significant information before the 
announcement, and the reaction in the trading day after if the information becomes public when 
markets are closed. With longer event windows the probability of existent concurrent events is 
higher, and this would result in the removal of more events from the analysis. 
4.4 Common definitions 
The estimation window length is           , with   as the latest day of the estimation 
window, and    as the earliest day of the estimation window relative to the event day. The event 
window length is           , with    as the latest day of the event window relative to the 
event day. The sample size is defined as   (i.e. number of events), and   refers to the number of 
non-missing returns in the estimation window of bank  . 
Assuming that ARs are independent and identically distributed the equal-weighted average 
abnormal return (AAR) on a single-day period   for a sample of   events is calculated as: 
 
     
 
 
     
 
   
 (9) 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for multiple-day periods (     ,) for a sample 
of   events is calculated as: 
 
               
  
    
 (10) 
The variance of ARs for each bank   is estimated over the estimation window as: 
 
      
 
      
        
 
  




where   is the number of parameters to estimate (2 if market model, 3 if two-index model and 5 
if four-factor model).  
4.5 Test statistics 
The literature on event study test statistics is very rich, as is the range of significance tests. 
Usually, significance tests can be grouped into two separate groups: parametric and non-
parametric tests. Parametric tests rely on assumptions about the distribution of ARs, as opposed 
to non-parametric tests which do not. To be certain that the results do not depend on a singular 
test, five parametric tests and two non-parametric tests will be used. 
4.5.1 Ordinary  -test 
The ordinary  -test is the standard parametric test statistic proposed by Mackinlay (1997). This 
method assumes that residuals are independent across events. It does not take into consideration 
cross-sectional correlation of residuals and the possibility of event-induced variance.  
For single-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis of 
no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
  
    
        
     (12) 
where        is the variance of AARs, estimated as: 
 
       
 
  
     
 
 
   
 (13) 
and     
  is the variance of ARs, estimated for each firm   during the estimation window as in 
equation (11) .  
For multiple-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis 
of no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
  
         
             
    (14) 
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where             is the variance of CAARs, estimated as: 
 
              
 
    
  
    
 (15) 
4.5.2 Crude dependence adjustment test 
To account for cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns, Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) 
suggest that firms should be grouped into a portfolio, and the time series (in event time) of 
average portfolio residuals over the estimation window is used to calculate the standard deviation 
of AARs. This parametric test uses a single variance estimate for the entire portfolio. As a result, 
it does not consider unequal return variances across securities. 
For single-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis of 
no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
     
    
    
 (16) 
where        is the standard deviation of the AARs, estimated as: 
 
      
 
     
                 
 
  
    
 
   
 (17) 
and              is estimated as: 
 
          
 
 
     
  
    
 (18) 
For multiple-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis 
of no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
     
     




4.5.3 Patell test 
In this parametric test, also known as “standardized residual test”, suggested by Patell (1976), 
residuals are first estimated as in the ordinary  -test. However, before being aggregated over time 
and across events, they are standardized. This standardization adjusts for the fact that event-
period residuals are out-of-sample predictions, thus having greater standard deviation than 
estimation-window residuals (Patell, 1976). Standardized values of residuals are obtained by 
dividing the event-period abnormal returns by the standard deviation of the estimation window, 
adjusted to reflect the forecast error (Boehmer et al., 1991). While this method assumes that 
residuals are cross-sectionally uncorrelated and that event-induced variance is insignificant, it 
allows for heteroskedasticity in event window residuals and helps prevent securities with large 
volatility from over-influencing the results.  The adjustment in this test is only calculated for the 
market model residuals. For the other two models residuals are standardized by the square root of 
their variance, calculated as in equation (11). 
The adjustment to the variance of ARs of each firm   is: 
 
         
 
   




          
 
           
   
    
  (20) 
where     is the average market return over the estimation window. 
Each AR is standardized for each time period   over the event window, thus obtaining 
standardized abnormal returns (SAR): 
 
       
     
      
 (21) 
Then, SARs are aggregated for each time period   over the event window, and cumulative 
standardized abnormal returns (CSAR) are calculated: 
 
             
 




For single-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis of 
no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
        
     
      
 (23) 
where        is estimated as: 
 
        
      
      
 
   
 
   
 (24) 
For multiple-day periods the SARs are first aggregated over time for individual firms: 
 
                   
  
    
 (25) 
For multiple-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis 
of no event effect, and is defined as: 
 




         
          
 
   
 (26) 
where            is estimated as: 
 
              
      
      
 
   
 (27) 
4.5.4 Standardized cross-sectional test 
Proposed by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), this is a widely used parametric test can 
be considered a hybrid between the Patell (1976) and ordinary cross-sectional tests. First, 
residuals are standardized as in equation (21), and then, instead of using the estimation window 
for the calculation of the standard deviation, observations from the event-period are used to 
estimate the standard deviation of event-period residuals. Overall, this method benefits from the 
properties of the other two methods used to create this one. It allows for event-induced variance 
and heterogeneity in variances of residuals. However, it does not account for cross-sectional 
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correlation between events. The adjustment in this test is only calculated for the market model 
residuals. For the other two models residuals are standardized by the square root of their variance, 
calculated as in equation (11). 
For single-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis of 
no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
     
     
     
 (28) 
where       is estimated as: 
 
       
 
     
         
 
 
       
 
   
 
  
   
 
   
 (29) 
For multiple-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis 
of no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
     
             
 
   
            
 (30) 
where              is the standardized cumulative abnormal return for firm  , estimated as: 
 
            
          
         
 (31) 
and           is the corrected standard deviation proposed by Mikkelson and Partch (1998), 
estimated as: 
 
            
 
   





            
  
    
 
 
           
   
    
  
   
 (32) 




            
 
     
              
 
 
            
 
   
 
  
   
 
   
 (33) 
4.5.5 Calendar-time test 
As pointed out by prior studies (e.g. Bernard, 1987; Collins and Dent, 1984), cross-sectional 
dependence across residuals may induce bias in standard errors, particularly when the event 
occurs in the same day for all firms, or when all firms belong to the same industry. When 
clustering occurs, it can be accommodated by aggregating residuals into portfolios based on 
calendar-time (Mackinlay, 1997). In this study all firms belong to the same industry, and there 
are events with the same calendar date for different firms. To account for this, Jaffe’s (1974) 
calendar time  -test is adopted. To conduct this test, clustered events are formed into portfolios 
according to event date, i.e., events that occurred on the same day are grouped into one equal-
weighted portfolio, and firms with isolated event dates correspond to single-security portfolios. 
Residuals are calculated for each portfolio, and based on the AARs for each portfolio during the 
estimation window a time series estimate of the standard deviation is obtained for each portfolio. 
Finally, like in the Patell (1976) test, the event-period residuals are standardized by dividing them 
by the estimated standard deviation. This method takes into account correlation between residuals 
and non-equal variances. 
For single-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis of 
no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
       
           
  
 (34) 
where   is the number of portfolios and             is the average standardized abnormal return, 
estimated as: 
 
            
  
     
    




where       is the abnormal return of portfolio   at event time   and        is the standard 
deviation of portfolio  , estimated as in equation (11) but for portfolio residuals. 
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For multiple-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis 
of no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
       
            
  
    
   
   (36) 
4.5.6 Cowan generalized sign test 
This non-parametric test introduced by Cowan (1992) takes into account the fraction   of positive 
residuals in the estimation window and compares it with the fraction of positive residuals in a 
certain event window. The null hypothesis is that the fraction of positive returns is the same as in 
the estimation window. 
For both single and multiple-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the 
null hypothesis of no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
       
      
        
 (37) 
where   is the fraction of positive ARs or CARs for a certain event-period or event window, and 








   
     
  
    
 (38) 
where      is 1 if the sign is positive and 0 otherwise. 
4.5.7 Corrado rank test 
The rank test procedure proposed by Corrado (1989) is a widely used non-parametric test that 
treats the estimation and event window as a single set of returns, and assigns a rank to each firm’s 
residuals. Rank one is attributed to the smallest residual.      is the rank of the abnormal return in 
the sample of       residuals of firm  . The ranks of the residuals of different days are 
dependent by construction. However, the effect of ignoring the dependence should be 
inconsequential for short event windows (Campbell and Weasley, 1993). 
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For single-day periods the test is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis of 
no event effect, and is defined as: 
 
      
               
     
 (39) 
where       is the average rank on event day t across N stocks, and       is estimated as: 
 
       
 
       
                  
 
  
    
 
   
 (40) 
For multiple-day periods, the test proposed by Campbell and Wesley (1993) is utilized. The test 
is asymptotically        distributed under the null hypothesis of no event effect, and is defined 
as:  
 
         
                       
     
 (41) 
where       is the average rank across firms and time in event window, and is estimated as: 
 







    
     
 
   
 (42) 
4.6 Cross-sectional analysis of CARs 
The estimated abnormal returns are frequently used as the dependent variable in a regression with 
firm-specific characteristics as explanatory variables. Such an exercise can provide theoretical 
insights and is particularly helpful when multiple sources exist for the origin of the abnormal 
returns, since it is an appropriate tool to investigate this association (Mackinlay, 1997). To 
investigate the results of the event study in greater detail, CARs are regressed against a set of 
explanatory variables, as expressed in the equations below: 
 
                             
   
   




                            
   
   
                     (44) 
The (-1, 1) CAR of event   is the dependent variable in a cross-sectional regression with the 
following firm-related explanatory variables:     proxies for the size of the settlement  , 
measured by the settlement amount divided by total assets of the correspondent bank at fiscal 
year-end prior to the settlement.       is the pre-tax return on assets of the bank correspondent 
to event  , measured by before-tax profitability divided by total assets, at fiscal year-end prior to 
the settlement.     is the capitalization, measured by the ratio of common equity to total assets, 
at fiscal year-end prior to the settlement.      is the size of the bank, measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets, at fiscal year-end prior to the settlement.     is the liquidity of the bank, 
calculated as the ratio of total loans to total deposits, at fiscal year-end prior to the settlement. 
        proxies for the credit quality of the ban, measured as the ratio of allowance for loan 
losses to total assets, at fiscal year-end prior to the settlement.        proxies for the portfolio 
risk of the ban, measured as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets, at fiscal year-end 
prior to the settlement.      is a measure of the solvency of the bank, measured as the Tier 1 
capital ratio at fiscal year-end prior to the settlement.     proxies for the efficiency of the bank, 
measured as the ratio of operating expenses to operating income, at fiscal year-end prior to the 
settlement.     is the tax amount paid by the bank, calculated as taxes divided by pre-tax 
income, at fiscal year-end prior to the settlement. To investigate if settlement-specific 
characteristics affect CARs, the type of misconduct and the agency with whom the settlement 
was reached, measured by the dummy variables     and        are introduced into the 
regression analysis. Time dummies that control for the year in which settlement   occurred are 
always included       . All variable definitions and data sources can be consulted in Appendix 
2. The selection of bank-specific characteristics aims to cover most of the structure of a bank and 
is in line with several studies investigating the determinants of profitability of banks (e.g., 
Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Berger, 1995; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999) and event studies 
focused in the banking industry (e.g., Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou, 2013; Köster and 
Pelster, 2017; Murphy et al., 2009). 
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As pointed out by Gonedes and Dopuch (1974), the error terms in this regression might be 
heteroskedastic if the abnormal return estimators have these properties. Karafiath (1994, 2009) 
provides simulation evidence on statistical tests in cross-sectional regressions using diverse 
estimation methods and finds that more sophisticated alternatives do not show clear advantages 
over OLS and WLS approaches. Moreover, under certain conditions and with a large sample size, 
tests using OLS are unbiased and as powerful as the WLS approach. Therefore, as suggested by 
Mackinlay (1997), the cross-sectional regressions are estimated via OLS with heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors, following White (1980), and also via WLS, with the weights for each 
observation corresponding to the inverse of the variance of the estimation period residuals. 
5. Sample selection, data sources and financial penalty trends  
5.1 Sample selection and data sources 
Expenses related to misconduct are usually not presented in a clear and transparent way in the 
publicly available bank reports. Such expenses tend to be aggregated with other expenses, 
making it infeasible to obtain segregated values. Therefore, due to this serious constraint I follow 
a different approach. Using several reliable sources of financial information (e.g. Bloomberg, 
Financial Times and Reuters News), public information from regulators and supervisors (e.g. 
Financial Conduct Authority, Federal Housing Finance Agency), as well as Violation Tracker
3
 
search engine, I collect data and build a hand-made dataset. This dataset includes the names of 
banks, the type of misconduct that originated the financial penalty, the amount of the penalty, the 
settlement date, and the entities imposing the penalty. Events are only considered when there is a 
settlement agreement. When there is more than one event on the same date for the same bank, the 
penalties are aggregated. To be included in the analysis, aggregate financial penalties have to be 
at least USD 100 million. Since not all settlements are reported in the press, it was decided that 
the sample would be composed of listed, well-known large banks that enjoy extensive media 
coverage. Considering this, all banks that used to be, and are currently included in the list of 
Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), published yearly by the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB), are included in the sample, as long as there is at least one event for the bank. The dataset 
                                                             
3 Violation Tracker is a search engine on corporate misconduct that covers litigation cases initiated by 43 USA 




contains 25 banks from 9 different countries and a total of 195 individual financial penalties, that 
amount to 149 aggregate financial penalties for the period between 2010 and February 2017. 
However, due to the existence of concurring events that might trigger different reactions from the 
market the sample is reduced to 141 events. The list of banks included in the sample can be seen 
in Appendix 3, and the number of events per bank in Appendix 4. The number of events per 
regulatory entity is shown in Appendix 5. 
Stock market data of banks and local market indexes is retrieved from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream database, while data used in the four-factor model is obtained from Kenneth French’s 
data library. All data obtained is daily. Accounting data is collected from Thomson Worldscope 
database and also from the annual reports made available by the banks. Since currency risk might 
lead to biased results (Irresberger et al., 2015), all accounting data is collected in US dollars.  
5.2 Summary statistics and financial penalty trends 
Since there is lack of empirical studies analyzing financial penalties in the banking sector, in this 
section I provide an overview of the data collected for the sample, with the goal of creating new 
knowledge about the magnitude and dynamics of such penalties. Information is reported for all 
banks in the sample, and separately for non-USA and USA banks. 
Summary statistics of individual financial penalties for all banks in the sample are shown in the 
first row of Panel A in Table 1. There are a total of 197 individual penalties. The average penalty 
is USD 1.08 billion and the median is USD 0.34 billion. As the mean and median suggest, the 
distribution of individual financial penalties is considerably skewed to the right. In fact, 75% of 
all penalties range from USD 0.09 billion to USD 0.72 billion and 90% of all penalties fall 
between USD 0.09 billion and USD 2.10 billion. The largest individual financial penalty in the 
dataset is USD 16.65 billion. Of all the individual penalties, 95 correspond to non-USA banks 
and the remaining 102 to USA banks. The average penalty is higher for USA banks than for non-
USA banks (USD 1.51 billion versus USD 0.60 billion), and the same is verified for medians 
(USD 0.37 billion versus USD 0.30 billion). For non-USA banks 75% of the penalties range 
between USD 0.09 billion and USD 0.52 billion, while for USA banks the penalties vary from 
USD 0.10 billion to USD 1.15 billion. For non-USA banks, the 10% largest penalties are above 
USD 0.95 billion, but for USA banks the 10% top penalties surpass USD 4.90 billion. The 





Summary statistics  




 P SD Min Max Kurt Skew 
Panel A: Individual financial penalties  
          
All banks 195 1.078 0.342 0.720 2.096 2.312 0.086 16.650 18.388 4.077 
Non-USA banks 93 0.605 0.298 0.523 0.954 1.277 0.086 8.974 28.687 5.208 
USA banks 102 1.509 0.374 1.150 4.900 2.896 0.100 16.650 11.114 3.250 
           Panel B: Aggregate financial penalties 
All banks 149 1.410 0.410 1.080 3.330 2.676 0.100 16.650 12.865 3.449 
Non-USA banks 63 0.893 0.340 0.822 2.324 1.571 0.100 8.974 15.097 3.730 
USA banks 86 1.789 0.463 1.525 5.300 3.214 0.100 16.650 8.549 2.914 
           Panel C: Cross-sectional analysis variables 
PEN 141 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.035 0.015 0.000 0.079 6.803 2.640 
BTROA 141 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.013 0.006 -0.008 0.024 -0.189 0.304 
CAP 141 0.079 0.087 0.104 0.112 0.027 0.025 0.129 -1.261 -0.268 
SIZE 141 21.226 21.380 21.541 21.636 0.470 18.852 21.749 4.477 -1.807 
LIQ 141 0.779 0.805 0.914 1.060 0.261 0.119 1.669 1.364 -0.163 
CREDITQ 141 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.017 0.007 0.000 0.049 6.627 1.704 
PORTFR 141 0.474 0.511 0.627 0.693 0.175 0.122 0.817 -1.086 -0.161 
SOLV 141 0.132 0.129 0.137 0.163 0.019 0.093 0.213 2.094 1.211 
EFF 141 0.747 0.743 0.862 0.959 0.148 0.447 1.156 -0.407 0.502 
TAX 141 0.332 0.264 0.312 0.541 1.098 -0.692 7.287 33.256 5.560 
This table presents descriptive statistics on individual financial penalties, aggregate financial penalties and for all variables used in the cross-sectional regression analysis. I report 
the number of observations, mean values, median values, 75th and 90th percentiles, standard deviation values, minimum values, maximum values, and also kurtosis and skewness 
coefficients. Descriptive statistics in Panels A and B are reported in USD bn. Definition of Panel C variables and data sources can be consulted in Appendix 2. 
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banks. Summary statistics for aggregate financial penalties are shown in Panel B of Table 1. Of 
course, due to the aggregation process almost all statistics exhibit higher values but the same 
conclusions as before apply to aggregate financial penalties. 
Fig. 1 to Fig. 3 show the number and total amount of individual financial penalties per year, for 
all banks, non-USA banks and USA banks. The number and total sum of penalties strongly 
increased from 2011 to 2012, from 11 to 25, and total sums of USD 10.09 billion to USD 33.94 
billion. The average penalty also increased from USD 1.19 billion to USD 1.36 billion. Non-USA 
banks were imposed more penalties than USA banks, but the latter were responsible for a total 
sum of USD 28.46 billion in settlements, as 2012 was the year in which USA authorities most 
notably started to go after  banks and punish them for their role in the latest global financial 
crisis. In 2013 penalties grew once again both in number and value, with USA banks being 
responsible for more than USD 44 billion. However, 2014 stands as the year with the largest 
number of financial penalties and settlement amounts. Non-USA banks reached 26 settlements 
totaling almost USD 17 billion, while USA banks attained 21 settlements amounting to USD 45.5 
billion. In 2015, despite being the year with the second largest number of penalties, it was the 
year with the lowest average settlement (USD 0.37 billion) since 2010. It was also the first year, 
in which non-USA banks’ settlements surpassed their American counterparts, totaling USD 9.73 
and USD 5.22 billion respectively. In 2016 there was a considerable decrease in the number of 
settlements (40 to 23), but the total amount of penalties increased almost 3 billion. Finally, until 
the end of February of 2017 there was a total of 5 settlements, with two of them being 
particularly large, both corresponding to non-USA banks. 
Fig. 4 shows the total financial penalties paid by banks categorized into seven different groups. It 
is clear that non-USA banks and USA banks have essentially been punished for different kinds of 
misconduct. Financial penalties imposed to American banks arise mostly from two kinds of 
misconduct: misseling of financial products to investors and errors in foreclosure processes. 
Usually, such settlements are civil law cases, and the payments that the banks are obliged to 
make are compensatory in nature, therefore being tax deductible under USA tax law. On the 
contrary, non-USA banks have been penalized for, in addition to misseling towards investors, 
violation of sanctions and market manipulation. Therefore, a large part of settlements for non-




Fig.  1 – Number and total amount of financial penalties by year (2017 only includes 2 months): All Banks 
 
 
Fig.  2 – Number and total amount of financial penalties by year (2017 only includes 2 months): Non-USA Banks 
 
 
































































































































Fig. 4 - Total amount (USD bn) of financial penalties categorized into seven different groups. “Misseling Practices” mainly includes settlements involving the misseling of 
mortgage-backed securities and credit default obligations. The grand majority of such settlements correspond to practices engaged during the period before and after the 2007-2009 
global financial crises. “Mortgage Abuses” consists in settlements related to errors in foreclosure processes. “Market Manipulation” involves financial penalties applied to banks 
that engage in practices that are seen as manipulations of financial markets (e.g. LIBOR rigging). “Sanctions” includes penal ties imposed to banks that engage in activities with 
countries present in USA’s OFAC sanctions list. “Compliance Violation” includes different violations against rules (e.g. anti-money laundering deficiencies). “Consumer/Investor 
Protection Violation” comprises different practices of misconduct that harm costumers or investors (e.g. discriminatory lending practices against minorities or misuse of customer 
cash). “Tax Offences” includes financial penalties imposed to banks that help customers to evade taxes. 
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Misseling of financial products to investors (e.g. mortgage-backed securities or credit 
default obligations) is the source of more than half of the total financial penalties in the 
sample, with a total value of almost USD 125 billion. Banks from USA paid the majority of 
this amount, with a total of USD 104.40 billion. The main reason for this is that USA 
authorities started to charge banks earlier for their role in the most recent global crisis. 
Shortly after the crisis, President Barack Obama created several agencies and mechanisms 
to combat financial crime. Most notably, in 2012 the Residential Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (RMBS) Working Group was created. Its main goal is to “investigate and 
prosecute misconduct by financial institutions in the origination and securitization of 
mortgages”. There are 60 individual financial penalties of this kind in the sample. The 
average penalty in this category is around USD 2.1 billion, and the largest penalty is USD 
16.65 billion, paid by Bank of America in 2014. In second place are financial penalties 
imposed to banks due to abuses in foreclosure processes, with a total amount of USD 33.64 
billion. Again, banks from USA are responsible for almost the total amount. This is 
explained by the joint state-federal settlements with the biggest USA banks shortly after the 
crisis period, most notably the National Mortgage Settlement in 2012 and the Foreclosure 
Settlement Review in 2013. Although there are only 13 penalties of this type, the average 
penalty is the largest amongst all categories, with a value of USD 2.59 billion. The highest 
amount is USD 11.8 billion, correspondent to a settlement reached with Bank of America in 
2012. 
Penalties resulting from market manipulation rank third with a total value of USD 15.64 
billion. Opposed to the two previous classes of misconduct, non-USA banks are responsible 
for the majority of the sum. The LIBOR (first disclosed in 2012) and Forex (first disclosed 
in 2013) scandals and their resulting settlements contribute heavily to this category. In both 
cases several big banks, acting as cartels, cooperated and engaged in erratic behaviors in 
order to achieve financial gains through the manipulation of benchmark interest rates and 
interest rate derivatives. There are 47 settlements in this category, with an average penalty 
of USD 0.33 billion. The largest penalty is USD 0.98 billion, paid by Deutsche Bank to the 
European Commission in 2013. Penalties imposed due to engaging in transactions with 
countries subject to USA sanctions amount to USD 13.40 billion, with an enormous (and 
the largest of this type) penalty of USD 8.97 billion imposed to BNP Paribas in 2014 
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representing more than half of this sum. On average, settlements in this category are around 
USD 0.91 billion. It is noteworthy to highlight that, in this sample, no USA banks have 
been penalized for this reason. Compliance violations seem to be common both in USA and 
non-USA banks, with a total amount of USD 12.88 billion for 36 different individual 
settlements, and an average penalty of USD 0.36 billion. Misconduct practices that may 
harm consumers and/or investors are more common in USA banks, with a total sum of 
roughly USD 6.50 billion for 19 individual penalties, and an average penalty of USD 0.34 
billion. Lastly, penalties imposed due to helping clients to evade taxes are only verified in 
non-USA banks. In total, this is the most uncommon type of misconduct, with only 6 
settlements, totaling USD 3.39 billion. 
In terms of agencies with whom settlements are reached, the U.S Department of Justice 
(DOJ) is responsible for a total amount of USD 74.11 billion, most of which resulting from 
cases related to misseling of financial securities. The years with the largest sums were 2014 
(USD 28 billion) and 2013 (USD 13 billion) In second comes the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA) with a total sum of USD 35.94 billion, with almost the entirety of this 
amount corresponding to 2014 (USD 15.65 billion) and 2013 (USD 17.50 billion). 
Appendixes 6 to 10 report a detailed coverage of settlements per category, for all banks, 
non-USA banks and USA banks. Appendix 9 reports settlements per agency. Appendix 10 
reports settlements per agency and category. The coverage includes the number of 
penalties, total sum, average, maximum and penalties.  
6. Results 
6.1 Event study results 
As mentioned, there are a total of 141 events (see Appendix 11), of which 61 correspond to 
non-USA banks and the remaining 80 to USA banks. Fig. 5 shows the development of 
average returns from 4 trading days before the event to 4 trading days after the event for the 
full sample and for the MSCI World Banks Index. Even without the event study results, it 
seems clear that the settlement announcements have a positive impact on the price of 
stocks. The graph shows that the average sample returns on the 3 days surrounding the 







Fig.  5 – Evolution of average returns from 4 trading days before to 4 trading days after the settlement for the full sample and for the MSCI World Banks Index. Days are relative to 























MSCI World Banks 
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Event study results are shown in Table 2 for all banks, Table 3 for non-USA banks, and 
Table 4 for USA banks.        
Panel A of Table 2 reports the CAARs and test statistics for four different event windows 
based on the market model for all settlements. Panel B reports the same results based on the 
ARs generated through the two-index model. In Panel C the same results are presented 
based on the four-factor model. All models show that the market reaction is positive on the 
day of the event. The AAR is around 0.26% based on the market model, 0.22% based on 
the two-index model, and 0.30% assuming the four-factor model. Parametric tests show 
statistical significance in all models, but the generalized sign test is not significant in any of 
the models and the rank test only shows positive significance when the market and four-
factor models are used. The CAAR on the three-day window (that includes the day before, 
the event day, and the day after the event) is the largest in absolute value of all windows 
analyzed for all models, with values of 0.72%, 0.66% and 0.64% corresponding to the 
market model, two-index model and four-factor model, respectively. All CAARs for the (-
1, 1) window are significantly positive based on all tests, with the exception of the 
generalized sign test. The mean CARs are also positive and significant in two different two-
day windows (both include the event day and one includes the day before and the other the 
day after the event). The CAAR for the (0, 1) window is the second largest in absolute 
value for all models (ranges from 0.49% to 0.56%), and also significant based on the 
parametric tests for all models and non-parametric tests for some models. Despite being the 
smallest in absolute value (varies from 0.39% to 0.43%) the mean CAR for the (-1, 0) 
window is also significantly positive based on most of the tests. To take into account the 
correlation between banks’ ARs when the event day is the same the calendar-time approach 
is also used for robustness. The results are shown in Appendix 12 and corroborate the 
results of the other parametric test statistics discussed above. By comparing the parametric 
and non-parametric approaches, it seems that the presence of extreme positive values might 
be over-influencing the results of the parametric tests, since non-parametric tests, 
particularly the generalized sign test, do not indicate positive abnormal performance in 
some windows. This is not surprising since each settlement is unique, in the sense that the 
outcome and terms reached depend on the specificities of each particular case. 




Cumulative abnormal returns following the resolution of litigation for all banks. 
Panel A: Market Model  
Observations 141 141 141 141 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 
CAAR 0.0026 0.0072 0.0043 0.0056 




























Generalized sign test 1.547 1.547 1.378 1.378 









     
Panel B: Two-Index Model 
Observations 141 141 141 141 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 
CAAR 0.0022 0.0066 0.0039 0.0049 




























Generalized sign test 1.310 1.478 0.973 1.141 





     
Panel C: Four-Factor Model 
Observations 141 141 141 141 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 
CAAR 0.0030 0.0064 0.0039 0.0055 










































This table presents the CAARs and correspondent significance tests for all banks in the sample for different event 
windows. Panel A reports the results based on the market model abnormal returns, Panel B shows the results based on the 
two-index model abnormal returns, and Panel C presents the results based on the four-factor model abnormal returns. 
Parameters for all models are estimated over a 250-day estimation window. Statistical significance of CAARs was 
assessed using the parametric and non-parametric tests described in section 4.5. BMP Test is referred to as standardized 
cross-sectional test within the text. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 




Cumulative abnormal returns following the resolution of litigation for non-USA banks. 
Panel A: Market Model  
Observations 61 61 61 61 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 
CAAR 0.0028 0.0075 0.0051 0.0052 
Ordinary  -test 1.465 2.293** 1.903* 1.942* 

























Generalized sign test 1.914
*
 0.890 1.146 1.146 







     
Panel B: Two-Index Model 
Observations 61 61 61 61 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 
CAAR 0.0022 0.0066 0.0046 0.0041 
Ordinary  -test 1.265 2.160** 1.873* 1.667* 

























Generalized sign test 2.216
**
 1.447 0.935 1.447 







     
Panel C: Four-Factor Model 
Observations 61 61 61 61 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 
CAAR 0.0027 0.0078 0.0046 0.0059 
Ordinary  -test 1.473 2.488** 1.782* 2.306** 

























Generalized sign test 0.380 2.173
**
 0.892 1.404 





This table presents the CAARs and correspondent significance tests for non-USA banks for different event windows. 
Panel A reports the results based on the market model abnormal returns, Panel B shows the results based on the two-index 
model abnormal returns, and Panel C presents the results based on the four-factor model abnormal returns. Parameters for 
all models are estimated over a 250-day estimation window. Statistical significance of CAARs was assessed using the 
parametric and non-parametric tests described in section 4.5. BMP Test is referred to as standardized cross-sectional test 




Cumulative abnormal returns following the resolution of litigation for USA banks. 
Panel A: Market Model  
Observations 80 80 80 80 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 
CAAR 0.0026 0.0070 0.0037 0.0058 
Ordinary  -test 1.629 2.590*** 1.687* 2.638*** 















Generalized sign test 0.381 1.277 0.829 0.829 
Corrado rank test 0.507 1.567 0.602 1.676
*
 
     
Panel B: Two-Index Model 
Observations 80 80 80 80 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 
CAAR 0.0022 0.0067 0.0034 0.0054 
Ordinary  -test 1.513 2.642*** 1.659* 2.647*** 















Generalized sign test -0.196 0.699 0.475 0.251 
Corrado rank test 0.121 1.011 0.099 1.225 
     
Panel C: Four-Factor Model 
Observations 80 80 80 80 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 
CAAR 0.0032 0.0053 0.0034 0.0052 




























Generalized sign test 1.148 1.595 0.924 1.818
*
 





This table presents the CAARs and correspondent significance tests for USA banks for different event windows. Panel A 
reports the results based on the market model abnormal returns, Panel B shows the results based on the two-index model 
abnormal returns, and Panel C presents the results based on the four-factor model abnormal returns. Parameters for all 
models are estimated over a 250-day estimation window. Statistical significance of CAARs was assessed using the 
parametric and non-parametric tests described in section 4.5. BMP Test is referred to as standardized cross-sectional test 
within the text. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.    
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For some smaller cases the settlement announcement might be the first time the case is 
actually covered. Both of these factors will influence investors’ reaction after a settlement. 
The assumption is that settlements are generally good news for investors, but if the 
outcome of a given settlement is anticipated beforehand and propagated throughout the 
media, if the announcement confirms it, it is expected a minor reaction from the market. On 
the other hand, when the outcome of a case is deemed to be much better for the bank than 
what was anticipated, or when not much was known about the case, it is expected that 
market participants react in a positive manner. Therefore, the presence of extreme positive 
ARs in the sample is expected. 
The results obtained for the full sample indicate that the resolution of unsolved litigation 
through settlements triggers a positive reaction from investors on the announcement day. 
Moreover, when analyzing event windows with more than one day the positive reaction 
persists. This might indicate that sometimes important information regarding a case’s 
resolution is already known by investors before it becomes public, while in other cases it’s 
not. To investigate this, the two sub-samples are analyzed separately (see Appendix 13 for 
descriptive statistics). Longer event windows were tested (results not reported), but 
conclusions identical to the ones of Köster and Pelster (2017) were obtained. That is, the 
announcements only have a short-term impact on the stock price of affected banks.  
Table 3 reports the results for non-USA banks and Table 4 for USA. banks. The mean 
CAR in the event day for non-USA banks is 0.28%, 0.22% and 0.27% according to the 
market model, two-index model and four-factor model, respectively. It is significantly 
positive based on the Patell and standardized cross-sectional tests for all models. 
Significance based on non-parametric tests varies depending on the model of choice. For 
USA banks the event day AAR is 0.26%, 0.22% and 0.32% based on the previously 
mentioned models, and it is only significantly positive when considering the four-factor 
model, based on all parametric approaches. The CAAR for non-USA banks ranges from 
0.66% to 0.78% for the (-1, 1) window depending on the model used, and for USA banks 
varies from 0.53 to 0.70% for the same window also according to different models. The 
largest mean CAR for non-USA and USA banks is generated by the four-factor model and 
the market model, respectively. For both sub-samples, the mean CAR is positive and 
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significant based on all parametric tests. With regard to non-parametric tests, for non-USA 
banks the rank test always suggests significantly positive ARs, while the generalized sign 
test is only significant for the four-factor model. For USA banks non-parametric tests 
suggest that there is no abnormal performance in the (-1, 1) window. More importantly, 
differences between sub-samples are patent when the two different two-day event windows 
are analyzed. For non-USA banks the CAAR for the (-1, 0) window varies between 0.46% 
and 0.51% depending on the model used and is significantly positive for all models based 
on all parametric tests and the rank test (apart from the four-factor model). The same does 
not apply to USA banks, since the majority of tests in all models do not detect positive 
ARs. For the (0, 1) event window both sub-samples seem to present significantly positive 
ARs. The mean CAR for USA banks ranges from 0.52% and 0.58% and is significant 
based on all parametric tests for all models. Again, non-parametric tests results depend on 
the model of choice. For non-USA banks the CAAR for the same window ranges from 
0.41% and 0.59% and results similar to the USA banks ones are obtained, but with weaker 
significance levels (apart from the standardized cross-sectional test).  
By analyzing the two sub-samples, it seems that sometimes for non-USA banks significant 
information about the resolution of litigation leaks before the announcement is covered by 
the media, while for USA banks this does not happen. Moreover, the settlements do trigger 
positive ARs for non-USA banks on the day they are announced, while the same is not 
verified for USA banks. One possibility is that deals with USA banks are often announced 
after the market closed (only the day of the announcement is considered, not the exact time 
of the announcement), so the effect of the announcement is only known on the next trading 
day. Finally, the positive reaction to the news seems to extend to the trading day after the 
announcement for both sub-samples, but appears to be more significant for USA banks. 
Overall, these results do seem to confirm that the resolution of pending litigation through 
settlements is received positively by investors. As previously mentioned the resolution of 
litigation removes uncertainty about the case and puts an end to further negative coverage 
by the media. The positive ARs also indicate that investors are pleased with the terms of the 
settlement, indicating that the magnitude of the penalty, taking into account the economic 
gain accrued from the misconduct, is smaller than anticipated. It might also be the case that 
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the amounts provisioned are in excess of the penalties imposed. In this case, the 
announcement allows banks to reveal good news to the market. Other reasons that can 
explain this reaction from the market participants include the partial tax deductibility of the 
penalties imposed, and cessation of the erratic behaviors that led to the penalties. In fact, 
most settlements reached through consent orders, deferred prosecution agreements and non-
prosecution agreements include remediation commitments that demand behavioral changes, 
and investors perceive it as good news. 
6.2 Cross-sectional analysis results 
Tables 5 to 7 show the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis of the (-1, 1) 
window CARs. Panel A of each table presents the results using OLS with robust standard 
errors, while Panel B shows the results using WLS with robust standard errors. Model (1) is 
the baseline regression. Model (2) is used to control for possible effects of outliers. To 
reduce the impact of extreme values all variables are winsorized at the 2% level. In Model 
(4) robust standard errors are clustered by bank. Model (5) adds a binary variable to 
baseline regression that assumes the value of 1 when the CAR corresponds to a USA bank. 
Appendixes 14 to 16 present the effect of the agency with whom the settlement was 
reached on CARs and Appendixes 17 to 19 show the effect of misconduct type on CARs. 
The relative size of the penalty exhibits a significant positive effect on CARs in all models 
for all panels for all return generating models. Larger penalties are imposed when large 
economic gains for the banks resulted from the misbehaviors. Larger settlements tend also 
to correspond to cases that are extensively covered by the media but whose outcome is not 
easily predictable. The settlement amount might also be lower than the amount provisioned 
by banks. The resolution of major lawsuits ends the negative coverage by the media and 
investors might consider that the settlements obtained indicate that banks get away lightly. 
For these reasons, it is not surprising that larger penalties trigger exceptionally positive 
reactions from investors. Additionally, the largest settlements in the sample correspond to 
USA banks and most of them include compensatory payments (mostly in the form of 




         Multivariate analysis of (-1, 1) market model CARs
4
. 
  Panel A: OLS Robust S.E.  
 
Panel B: WLS Robust S.E.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PEN 0.349*** 0.367*** 0.349*** 0.362*** 
 
0.491*** 0.507*** 0.491*** 0.506*** 
BTROA -0.904 -0.909 -0.904 -0.725 
 
-0.581 -0.564 -0.581 -0.486 
CAP 0.207 0.230 0.207 0.418* 
 
0.171 0.192 0.171 0.312 
SIZE -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 
 
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
LIQ 0.007 0.004 0.007 -0.004 
 
0.006 0.004 0.006 -0.003 
CREDITQ -0.343 -0.078 -0.343 -0.263 
 
-0.073 0.197 -0.073 -0.025 
PORTFR -0.039 -0.047 -0.039 -0.041 
 
-0.039 -0.046 -0.039 -0.037 
SOLV 0.093 0.1341 0.093 0.075 
 
0.150 0.170 0.150 0.141 
EFF -0.053* -0.055** -0.053** -0.048 
 
-0.046* -0.045* -0.046* -0.041 
TAX 0.002 0.002 0.002** 0.002 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
USA 
   
-0.016 
    
-0.012 
INTERCEPT 0.198 0.146 0.198 0.158   0.004 -0.024 0.004 -0.019 
This table presents the results of regressing the (-1, 1) market model CARs on a set of explanatory variables. Panel A presents the results using as estimation method OLS with 
robust standard errors, while for panel B WLS with robust standard errors is used. Model (1) is the baseline regression. In model (2) variables are winsorized at the 2% level. In 
model (3) the baseline regression is estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. In Model (4) a dummy variable indicating whether it is a USA or non-USA bank is 
added to the baseline regression. Dummy variables that control for the year of each observation are included in all models. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
                                                             
4 I also run all regressions without the variable PEN. In Panel A variable EFF becomes non-significant in model (1). In Panel B variable EFF becomes non-




         Multivariate analysis of (-1, 1) two-index model CARs
5
 
  Panel A: OLS Robust S.E.  
 
Panel B: WLS Robust S.E.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PEN 0.336*** 0.349*** 0.336*** 0.354*** 
 
0.425*** 0.436*** 0.425*** 0.445*** 
BTROA -0.815 -0.771 -0.815 -0.570 
 
-0.590 -0.550 -0.590 -0.458 
CAP 0.208 0.223 0.208 0.497** 
 
0.190 0.215 0.190 0.387* 
SIZE -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 
 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
LIQ 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.014 
 
0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.009 
CREDITQ -0.103 0.127 -0.103 0.007 
 
0.087 0.338 0.087 0.150 
PORTFR -0.048 -0.053 -0.048 -0.050 
 
-0.043 -0.050 -0.043 -0.040 
SOLV 0.019 0.055 0.019 -0.007 
 
0.060 0.079 0.060 0.044 
EFF -0.054* -0.053** -0.054** -0.047* 
 
-0.042 -0.040 -0.042* -0.035 
TAX 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.003* 
 
0.002 0.002 0.002* 0.003* 
USA 
   
-0.022** 
    
-0.016 
INTERCEPT 0.224 0.174 0.224* 0.168   0.043 0.019 0.043 0.010 
This table presents the results of regressing the (-1, 1) two-index model CARs on a set of explanatory variables. Panel A presents the results using as estimation method OLS with 
robust standard errors, while for panel B WLS with robust standard errors is used. Model (1) is the baseline regression. In model (2) variables are winsorized at the 2% level. In 
model (3) the baseline regression is estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. In Model (4) a dummy variable indicating whether it is a USA or non-USA bank is 
added to the baseline regression. Dummy variables that control for the year of each observation are included in all models. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
                                                             
5 I also run all regressions without the variable PEN. In Panel A variable EFF becomes non-significant in model (4). In Panel B variable EFF becomes non-




         Multivariate analysis of (-1, 1) four-factor model CARs
6
. 
  Panel A: OLS Robust S.E.  
 
Panel B: WLS Robust S.E.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
PEN 0.321*** 0.336*** 0.321*** 0.333*** 
 
0.346*** 0.356*** 0.346*** 0.358*** 
BTROA 0.141 -0.066 0.141 0.306 
 
0.070 -0.085 0.070 0.153 
CAP 0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.195 
 
0.010 -0.005 0.010 0.140 
SIZE -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
LIQ -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.011 
 
0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.009 
CREDITQ 0.252 0.262 0.252 0.326 
 
0.570 0.607 0.570 0.609 
PORTFR -0.036 -0.031 -0.036 -0.037 
 
-0.032 -0.027 -0.032 -0.030 
SOLV -0.062 0.011 -0.062 -0.079 
 
0.101 0.159 0.101 0.086 
EFF -0.032 -0.040 -0.032 -0.027 
 
-0.032 -0.038 -0.032 -0.028 
TAX 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*** 0.003* 
 
0.003* 0.003* 0.003** 0.003* 
USA 
   
-0.015 
    
-0.011 
INTERCEPT 0.217 0.203 0.217 0.180   0.029 0.023 0.029 -0.001 
This table presents the results of regressing the (-1, 1) four-factor model CARs on a set of explanatory variables. Panel A presents the results using as estimation method OLS with 
robust standard errors, while for panel B WLS with robust standard errors is used. Model (1) is the baseline regression. In model (2) variables are winsorized at the 2% level. In 
model (3) the baseline regression is estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. In Model (4) a dummy variable indicating whether it is a USA or non-USA bank is 
added to the baseline regression. Dummy variables that control for the year of each observation are included in all models. Statistical significance is indicated by ***, **, and * at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
                                                             
6 I also run all regressions without the variable PEN. In Panel A there are no changes.  In Panel B variable EFF becomes non-significant in model (2), and variable 
TAX becomes non-significant in models (1) and (4). 
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affect the ARs experienced upon resolution of litigation. The variable EFF coefficient is 
negative and significant in most models of panel A for Tables 5 and 6. This negative effect 
on CARs is reasonable since the additional cost of financial penalties has a negative impact 
in the results and earnings of affected banks. Therefore, banks with higher efficiency ratios 
(i.e. less efficient) experience lower CARs than more efficient banks. The variable TAX 
coefficient is positive and significant for most models in panel A of Tables 6 and 7 and for 
some models in panel B of the same tables. This finding is consistent with the tax 
deductibility property of some financial penalties. Assuming all else equal, banks with 
higher effective tax rates seem to experience larger positive CARs. The binary variable 
controlling for differences between USA and non-USA banks is negative but only 
significant in panel A of Table 6, so there is not enough evidence to conclude that CARs 
for USA banks are smaller than for non-USA banks. 
As for the impact of specific agencies on CARs, settlements reached with the Federal 
Housing Financing Agency (FHFA) seem to prompt lower CARs when compared to other 
agencies, since the coefficient of the correspondent dummy variable is negative and 
significant in all panels of Appendixes 14 to 16. FHFA, in the role of conservator of 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, alongside private lawyers filed 18 suits in 2011 against 
major banks, long before other agencies went after banks, accusing them of misrepresenting 
about USD 200 billion in mortgage-backed securities sold to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, 
alleging a variety of violations of federal securities law and civil law
7
. Apparently, the deals 
reached with FHFA do not seem to have pleased investors in the same way other deals 
have. On the contrary, settlements with private entities appear to be particularly good news, 
since the respective dummy variable coefficient is significant and positive in most panels of 
Appendixes 14 to 16. 
Finally, with respect to the impact of misconduct type on CARs, it was found that the 
dummy variable correspondent to foreclosure abuses is significant and positive for both 
panels in Appendixes 17 and 18. Considering that, as previously mentioned, USA banks 
are responsible for almost the total amount of settlements in this category (see Fig. 4), this 






can be considered as evidence that settlements resulting in financial penalties that can be 
deducted for tax purposes are particularly well received by investors. In fact, penalties for 
foreclosure abuses can be considered compensatory in nature, with most of the USD 34 
billion sum being composed of consumer relief and not monetary payments to agencies. 
Another possible explanation is that most of these cases were widely discussed by the 
media and the outcomes were surprisingly positive. The coefficient of the dummy variable 
regarding violation of sanctions is also positive and significant for all panels B in 
Appendixes 17 to 19. Some arguments might explain this: First, in such cases, criminal 
law is applied instead of civil law. However, all cases in the sample are settled either 
through non-prosecution agreements (most common) or guilty plea, which are most 
probably well received by investors. Second, breaching of economic sanctions mostly 
happens due to poor anti-money-laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) 
compliance frameworks. In such cases, even if rare, banks might get into situations of 
getting their license revoked
8
. Third, as shown in Panel C Appendix 6, the average penalty 
for this type of misconduct is considerably larger when compared to other forms of 
misconduct in which criminal law is also applied. In fact, from all categories, the average 
penalty for violating sanctions is the third largest in value, only surpassed by penalties 
related to foreclosure abuses and misseling of financial products. As discovered before, 
larger settlements have a positive impact on banks’ CARs. Due to these reasons, investors 
seem to be especially pleased if litigation of this particular category is settled, resulting in 
higher CARs. 
7. Conclusions  
This study intends to extend prior research on corporate misconduct in the financial sector, 
by examining settlement announcement events between GSIBs and regulators resulting in 
the conclusion of unsolved litigation for the period January 2010-February 2017. Due to 
lack of research on this particular topic, an overview of financial penalty trends is provided 
for the banks in the sample. To assess the impact of settlements on the stock market 
performance of banks an event study is conducted. Furthermore, with the intent of 
                                                             




explaining the determinants of ARs I apply a cross-sectional regression model with CARs 
as the dependent variable several bank-specific and settlement-specific characteristics as 
explanatory variables.  
The event study results for the full sample show that the market reaction is significantly 
positive on the day a settlement is announced and for three different multi-day event 
windows ((-1, 1), (0, 1) and (-1, 0)). This might indicate that in some cases relevant 
information about the outcome of a case will surface before the public announcement, 
while other times this may not be true. Results for non-USA and USA bank sub-samples 
indicate that leakage of information only exists in non-USA banks, since the (-1, 0) event 
window mean CAR is proved to be significantly positive, while for USA banks this is not 
verified. Additionally, for USA banks the positive reaction from the market seems to occur 
on the day after the announcement. However, this might be due to the timing of the 
announcement (i.e. after the market is closed).  
The cross-sectional analysis of CARs shows that the relative size of the penalty has a 
positive impact on the ARs. A reasonable explanation is that major settlements are usually 
widely covered by the media and there is great speculation around them. If the final 
outcome is better than expected this should be received as good news by investors. It also 
seems that less effective banks are penalized by the market and that banks with higher 
effective tax rates seem to experience larger positive CARs. Settlements with the FHFA 
appear to not please investors, as opposed to what’s verified with private parties. Finally, 
regarding the impact of the type of misconduct, settlements involving foreclosure abuses 
and violation of sanctions are particularly well received by the market, resulting in higher 
positive ARs. 
Overall, the results seem to confirm that investors are pleased with resolution of litigation 
through settlements. Different factors contribute to this: First, the settlement eliminates 
uncertainty about the case and ends further negative coverage by the media. Second, the 
terms of the settlement might be better than anticipated. Third, partial tax deductibility 
offsets to a certain degree the impact of the penalties. Fourth, the settlement is expected to 
lead to more responsible practices by the management and to an abolishment of erratic 
behaviors within the bank. 
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Some limitations of this study include the small number of banks being analyzed, the 
criteria for including an event in the sample and not considering the exact time of the 
announcements. For future research, based on the results obtained and results from prior 
research, as suggested by Gillet et al. (2010), by considering all the stages in litigation 
processes, creating an event-driven investment strategy that goes long when there are 























 Benchmark indexes and datasets used per country. 
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Sum of abnormal returns for (-1, 1) window. 
 
Datastream, own calc. 
PEN 
 
Ratio of penalty amount to total assets at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
BTROA 
 
Ratio of pre-tax income to total assets at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
CAP 
 
Ratio of common equity to total assets at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
SIZE 
 
Natural logarithm of total assets at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
LIQ 
 
Ratio of total loans to total deposits at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
CREDITQ 
 
Ratio of allowance for loan losses to total assets at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
PORTFR 
 
Ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
SOLV 
 
Tier 1 capital ratio at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
EFF 
 
Ratio of operating expenses to operating income at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
TAX 
 
Ratio of taxes paid to pre-tax income at FY-end prior to the penalty. 
 
Worldscope, annual reports. 
AGEN 
 
Dummy variables indicating the agency with whom the settlement was reached. 
 
Own elab. 
CAT   Dummy variables indicating the misconduct category.   Own elab. 








List of sample banks. 
Banks     Country # Banks 
Agricultural Bank of China Intesa Sanpaolo 
 
China 1 
Bank of America JP Morgan Chase & Co 
 
France 3 
Barclays Lloyds Banking Group 
 
Germany 2 
BNP Paribas Mitsubishi UFJ Financial 
 
Italy 1 
Bank of  New York Mellon Mizuho FG 
 
Japan 2 
Citigroup Morgan Stanley 
 
Netherlands 1 
Commerzbank Royal Bank of Scotland 
 
Switzerland 2 
Crédit Agricole Société Générale 
 
United Kingdom 5 
Credit Suisse Standard Chartered 
 
USA 8 
Deutsche Bank State Street Corporation 
 
Total 25 
Goldman Sachs UBS Group 
 
  HSBC Wells Fargo & Company 
   
ING Bank         
This table presents all sample banks listed in alphabetical order and an overview of the total number of banks sorted by 




















Agricultural Bank of China 
 
1 







































JP Morgan Chase & Co 
 
21 
Lloyds Banking Group 
 
2 
























Wells Fargo & Company   9 
Total   141 













Banca d'Italia (BDI) 
 
1 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFT) 
 
3 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
3 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
24 
European Commission (EC) 
 
5 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
3 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
 
1 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
3 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
 
2 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
17 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) 
 
1 






National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
5 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
10 










This table presents all sample agencies listed in alphabetical order and the number of events per agency. Whenever there 






Descriptive statistics of individual penalties per misconduct category for all banks in USD bn. 
Panel A: # Penalties                 
Category 
 
Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
36 2 3 9 13 4 3 - 2 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 18 - 3 6 2 1 3 1 2 
Market Manipulation 
 
47 - 6 14 10 8 5 3 1 
Misseling Practices 
 
60 3 8 4 14 16 6 7 2 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
13 - 2 - - 7 4 - - 
Sanctions 
 
15 - - 6 2 2 4 - 1 
Tax Offences   6 - 1 1 3 - - - 1 
           
Panel B: Total amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
12.88 0.63 0.72 2.54 5.90 0.92 1.92 - 0.26 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 6.11 - 0.99 2.31 0.94 0.39 0.73 0.34 0.42 
Market Manipulation 
 
15.64 - 1.14 6.59 2.14 3.28 1.82 0.54 0.14 
Misseling Practices 
 
124.74 13.30 14.12 0.91 41.78 37.68 3.58 12.22 1.15 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
33.64 - 0.60 - - 8.44 24.60 - - 
Sanctions 
 
13.72 - - 2.50 9.29 0.35 1.29 - 0.30 
Tax Offences   3.39 - 0.12 0.10 2.62 - - - 0.55 
           
Panel C: Average amount  
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
0.36 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.64 - 0.13 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 0.34 - 0.33 0.38 0.47 0.39 0.24 0.34 0.21 
Market Manipulation 
 
0.33 - 0.19 0.47 0.21 0.41 0.36 0.18 0.14 
Misseling Practices 
 
2.08 4.43 1.77 0.23 2.98 2.35 0.60 1.75 0.58 
Mortgage Abuses 
 





Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Sanctions 
 
0.91 - - 0.42 4.64 0.18 0.32 - 0.30 
Tax Offences   0.56 - 0.12 0.10 0.87 - - - 0.55 
           
Panel D: Maximum amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
1.70 0.43 0.27 0.44 1.70 0.30 1.26 - 0.15 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 0.75 - 0.42 0.73 0.75 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.31 
Market Manipulation 
 
0.98 - 0.37 0.93 0.31 0.98 0.70 0.23 0.14 
Misseling Practices 
 
16.65 7.20 5.00 0.33 16.65 13.00 2.43 8.50 0.60 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
11.80 - 0.47 - - 2.89 11.80 - - 
Sanctions 
 
8.97 - - 0.65 8.97 0.25 0.62 - 0.30 
Tax Offences   1.80 - 0.12 0.10 1.80 - - - 0.55 
           
Panel E: Minimum amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
0.11 0.21 0.22 0.11 0.25 0.20 0.17 - 0.11 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 0.11 - 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.39 0.13 0.34 0.11 
Market Manipulation 
 
0.09 - 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.14 
Misseling Practices 
 
0.10 0.80 0.19 0.18 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.55 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
0.13 - 0.13 - - 0.23 2.20 - - 
Sanctions 
 
0.10 - - 0.20 0.32 0.10 0.10 - 0.30 
Tax Offences   0.10 - 0.12 0.10 0.10 - - - 0.55 
This table presents descriptive statistics of individual financial penalties per misconduct category for the full sample. Panel A reports the number of events. Panel B reports the total 
amount. Panel C reports the average settlement. Panel D reports the maximum settlement. Panel E reports the minimum settlement. Results are reported for each year and for the 





Descriptive statistics of individual penalties per misconduct category for non-USA banks in USD bn. 
Panel A: # Penalties                 
Category 
 
Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
16 2 2 5 4 - 3 - - 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
3 - - 1 1 - 1 - - 
Market Manipulation 
 
34 - 2 12 8 6 5 1 - 
Misseling Practices 
 
16 2 2 1 5 3 2 1 - 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
3 - 2 - - 1 - - - 
Sanctions 
 
15 - - 6 2 2 4 - 1 
Tax Offences   6 - 1 1 3 - - - 1 
           
Panel B: Total amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
5.87 0.63 0.45 1.51 1.36 - 1.92 - - 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
0.50 - - 0.18 0.20 - 0.13 - - 
Market Manipulation 
 
11.60 - 0.23 5.11 1.52 2.77 1.82 0.16 - 
Misseling Practices 
 
20.31 12.50 2.12 0.33 1.94 2.96 0.32 0.15 - 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
0.85 - 0.60 - - 0.25 - - - 
Sanctions 
 
13.72 - - 2.50 9.29 0.35 1.29 - 0.30 
Tax Offences   3.39 - 0.12 0.10 2.62 - - - 0.55 
           
Panel C: Average amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
0.37 0.32 0.23 0.30 0.34 - 0.64 - - 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
0.17 - - 0.18 0.20 - 0.13 - - 
Market Manipulation 
 
0.34 - 0.11 0.43 0.19 0.46 0.36 0.16 - 
Misseling Practices 
 
1.27 6.25 1.06 0.33 0.39 0.99 0.16 0.15 - 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
0.28 - 0.30 - - 0.25 - - - 
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Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Sanctions 
 
0.91 - - 0.42 4.64 0.18 0.32 - 0.30 
Tax Offences   0.56 - 0.12 0.10 0.87 - - - 0.55 
           
Panel D: Maximum amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
1.26 0.43 0.24 0.44 0.37 - 1.26 - - 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
0.20 - - 0.18 0.20 - 0.13 - - 
Market Manipulation 
 
0.98 - 0.13 0.80 0.29 0.98 0.70 0.16 - 
Misseling Practices 
 
7.20 7.20 1.10 0.33 0.89 1.93 0.20 0.15 - 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
0.47 - 0.47 - - 0.25 - - - 
Sanctions 
 
8.97 - - 0.65 8.97 0.25 0.62 - 0.30 
Tax Offences   1.80 - 0.12 0.10 1.80 - - - 0.55 
           
Panel E: Minimum amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
0.11 0.21 0.22 0.11 0.30 - 0.17 - - 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
0.13 - - 0.18 0.20 - 0.13 - - 
Market Manipulation 
 
0.09 - 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.16 0.16 - 
Misseling Practices 
 
0.10 5.30 1.02 0.33 0.10 0.15 0.12 0.15 - 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
0.13 - 0.13 - - 0.25 - - - 
Sanctions 
 
0.10 - - 0.20 0.32 0.10 0.10 - 0.30 
Tax Offences   0.10 - 0.12 0.10 0.10 - - - 0.55 
This table presents descriptive statistics of individual financial penalties per misconduct category for non-USA banks. Panel A reports the number of events. Panel B reports the 
total amount. Panel C reports the average settlement. Panel D reports the maximum settlement. Panel E reports the minimum settlement. Results are reported for each year and for 





Descriptive statistics of individual penalties per misconduct category for USA banks in USD bn. 
Panel A: # Penalties                     
Category 
 
Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
20 - - 4 9 4 - - 2 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
15 - 3 5 1 1 2 1 2 
Market Manipulation 
 
13 - 4 2 2 2 - 2 1 
Misseling Practices 
 
44 1 6 3 9 13 4 6 2 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
10 - - - - 6 4 - - 
Sanctions 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Tax Offences   - - - - - - - - - 
           
Panel B: Total amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
7.01 - 0.27 1.03 4.54 0.92 - - 0.26 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
5.61 - 0.99 2.13 0.75 0.39 0.60 0.34 0.42 
Market Manipulation 
 
4.04 - 0.92 1.48 0.62 0.51 - 0.38 0.14 
Misseling Practices 
 
104.43 0.80 12.01 0.59 39.84 34.71 3.26 12.07 1.15 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
32.79 - - - - 8.19 24.60 - - 
Sanctions 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Tax Offences   - - - - - - - - - 
           
Panel C: Average amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
0.35 - 0.27 0.26 0.50 0.23 - - 0.13 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
0.37 - 0.33 0.43 0.75 0.39 0.30 0.34 0.21 
Market Manipulation 
 
0.31 - 0.23 0.74 0.31 0.26 - 0.19 0.14 
Misseling Practices 
 
2.37 0.80 2.00 0.20 4.43 2.67 0.82 2.01 0.58 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
3.28 - - - - 1.37 6.15 - - 
53 
 
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Sanctions 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Tax Offences   - - - - - - - - - 
           
Panel D: Maximum amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
1.70 - 0.27 0.34 1.70 0.30 - - 0.15 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
0.75 - 0.42 0.73 0.75 0.39 0.37 0.34 0.31 
Market Manipulation 
 
0.93 - 0.37 0.93 0.31 0.41 - 0.23 0.14 
Misseling Practices 
 
16.65 0.80 5.00 0.23 16.65 13.00 2.43 8.50 0.60 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
11.80 - - - - 2.89 11.80 - - 
Sanctions 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Tax Offences   - - - - - - - - - 
           
Panel E: Minimum amount 
 
                  
Category   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Compliance Violation 
 
0.11 - 0.27 0.14 0.25 0.20 - - 0.11 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation 
 
0.11 - 0.19 0.19 0.75 0.39 0.23 0.34 0.11 
Market Manipulation 
 
0.10 - 0.12 0.55 0.31 0.10 - 0.15 0.14 
Misseling Practices 
 
0.13 0.80 0.19 0.18 0.28 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.55 
Mortgage Abuses 
 
0.23 - - - - 0.23 2.20 - - 
Sanctions 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Tax Offences   - - - - - - - - - 
This table presents descriptive statistics of individual financial penalties per misconduct category for USA banks. Panel A reports the number of events. Panel B reports the total 
amount. Panel C reports the average settlement. Panel D reports the maximum settlement. Panel E reports the minimum settlement. Results are reported for each year and for the 





Descriptive statistics of individual penalties per agency in USD bn. 
Panel A: # Penalties 
          
Agency   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Banca d'Italia (BDI) 
 
1 - 1 - - - - - - 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
5 - 1 2 1 1 - - - 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
17 - 3 3 7 2 2 - - 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
40 2 4 10 7 1 9 4 3 
European Commission (EC) 
 
5 - 2 - - 3 - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
15 1 - 5 6 2 1 - - 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
 
1 - - 1 - - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
14 - 1 7 1 3 2 - - 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
 
2 - - - - 2 - - - 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
19 - - - 8 9 - 2 - 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) 
 
1 - - - - - - - 1 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
 
1 - - - - - - - 1 
Joint 
 
6 - 1 - 1 - 4 - - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
5 - 1 2 - 1 - 1 - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
15 1 2 6 3 2 1 - - 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
11 - - - 4 6 1 - - 
Private 
 
18 1 4 2 3 3 2 2 1 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
18 - 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA)   1 - - - 1 - - - - 
           
Panel B: Total amount 
          
Agency   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Banca d'Italia (BDI) 
 
0.12 - 0.12 - - - - - - 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
2.24 - 0.19 0.92 0.75 0.39 - - - 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
5.05 - 0.55 1.32 1.86 0.43 0.90 - - 
55 
 
Agency   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
74.29 12.50 9.87 5.33 28.00 13.00 3.73 0.87 0.99 
European Commission (EC) 
 
2.32 - 0.50 - - 1.82 - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
4.02 0.21 - 1.26 1.95 0.36 0.26 - - 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
 
0.14 - - 0.14 - - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
3.30 - 0.13 2.05 0.10 0.76 0.27 - - 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
 
0.90 - - - - 0.90 - - - 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
35.94 - - - 15.64 17.49 - 2.82 - 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) 
 
0.11 - - - - - - - 0.11 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
 
0.11 - - - - - - - 0.11 
Joint 
 
33.67 - 0.10 - 8.97 - 24.60 - - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
1.96 - 1.10 0.55 - 0.17 - 0.15 - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
5.47 0.43 0.45 2.58 1.33 0.35 0.34 - - 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
9.99 - - - 1.30 8.19 0.50 - - 
Private 
 
25.85 0.80 3.62 0.32 2.15 6.74 2.81 8.82 0.60 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
4.51 - 1.07 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.55 0.44 1.01 
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA)   0.14 - - - 0.14 - - - - 
           Panel C: Average amount 
          
Agency   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Banca d'Italia (BDI) 
 
0.12 - 0.12 - - - - - - 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
0.45 - 0.19 0.46 0.75 0.39 - - - 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
0.30 - 0.18 0.44 0.27 0.21 0.45 - - 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
1.86 6.25 2.47 0.53 4.00 13.00 0.41 0.22 0.33 
European Commission (EC) 
 
0.46 - 0.25 - - 0.61 - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
0.27 0.21 - 0.25 0.32 0.18 0.26 - - 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
 
0.14 - - 0.14 - - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
0.24 - 0.13 0.29 0.10 0.25 0.13 - - 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
 





Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) 
 
0.11 - - - - - - - 0.11 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
 
0.11 - - - - - - - 0.11 
Joint 
 
5.61 - 0.10 - 8.97 - 6.15 - - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
0.39 - 1.10 0.28 - 0.17 - 0.15 - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
0.36 0.43 0.23 0.43 0.44 0.18 0.34 - - 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
0.91 - - - 0.33 1.36 0.50 - - 
Private 
 
1.44 0.80 0.91 0.16 0.72 2.25 1.40 4.41 0.60 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
0.25 - 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.34 
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) 
 
0.14 - - - 0.14 - - - - 
           Panel D: Maximum amount 
          
Agency 
 
Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Banca d'Italia (BDI) 
 
0.12 - 0.12 - - - - - - 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
0.75 - 0.19 0.73 0.75 0.39 - - - 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
0.80 - 0.25 0.80 0.31 0.33 0.70 - - 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
16.65 7.20 5.00 0.93 16.65 13.00 1.26 0.34 0.55 
European Commission (EC) 
 
0.98 - 0.37 - - 0.98 - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
0.44 0.21 - 0.44 0.37 0.22 0.26 - - 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
 
0.14 - - 0.14 - - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
0.34 - 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.33 0.17 - - 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
 
0.49 - - - - 0.49 - - - 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
10.35 - - - 9.30 10.35 - 1.52 - 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) 
 
0.11 - - - - - - - 0.11 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
 
0.11 - - - - - - - 0.11 
Joint 
 
11.80 - 0.10 - 8.97 - 11.80 - - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
1.10 - 1.10 0.33 - 0.17 - 0.15 - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
0.72 0.43 0.24 0.61 0.72 0.25 0.34 - - 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
2.89 - - - 0.35 2.89 0.50 - - 
57 
 
Agency   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Private 
 
8.50 0.80 1.42 0.18 0.95 4.50 2.43 8.50 0.60 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
0.55 - 0.42 0.31 0.28 0.20 0.30 0.29 0.55 
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA)   0.14 - - - 0.14 - - - - 
           Panel E: Minimum amount 
          
Agency   Total 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 
Banca d'Italia (BDI) 
 
0.12 - 0.12 - - - - - - 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
0.19 - 0.19 0.19 0.75 0.39 - - - 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
0.10 - 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.20 - - 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
0.09 5.30 0.47 0.10 0.09 13.00 0.16 0.15 0.14 
European Commission (EC) 
 
0.13 - 0.13 - - 0.31 - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
0.11 0.21 - 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.26 - - 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
 
0.14 - - 0.14 - - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
0.10 - 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.10 - - 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
 
0.41 - - - - 0.41 - - - 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
0.10 - - - 0.10 0.40 - 1.30 - 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) 
 
0.11 - - - - - - - 0.11 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
 
0.11 - - - - - - - 0.11 
Joint 
 
0.10 - 0.10 - 8.97 - 2.20 - - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
0.15 - 1.10 0.23 - 0.17 - 0.15 - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
0.10 0.43 0.22 0.15 0.30 0.10 0.34 - - 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
0.25 - - - 0.25 0.25 0.50 - - 
Private 
 
0.14 0.80 0.19 0.14 0.55 0.50 0.38 0.32 0.60 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
0.12 - 0.27 0.18 0.20 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.15 
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA)   0.14 - - - 0.14 - - - - 
This table presents descriptive statistics of individual financial penalties per agency for the full sample. Panel A reports the number of events. Panel B reports the total amount. 
Panel C reports the average settlement. Panel D reports the maximum settlement. Panel E reports the minimum settlement. Results are reported for each year and for the full sample 




Descriptive statistics of individual penalties per agency and misconduct category in USD bn. 
Panel A: # Penalties                 
Agency/Misconduct category 
 
COMPV CIPBV MARKM MISSP MORTA SANC TAXO 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
- 5 - - - - - 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
1 - 16 - - - - 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
2 4 14 11 1 5 3 
European Commission (EC) 
 
- - 5 - - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
9 2 4 - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
8 - - - 3 2 1 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
- - - 19 - - - 
Joint 
 
- - 1 - 4 1 - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
- - - 5 - - - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
4 - 3 - - 7 1 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
6 - - - 5 - - 
Private 
 
1 - 1 16 - - - 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
3 6 - 9 - - - 
Other   2 1 3 - - - 1 
         Panel B: Total amount                 
Agency/Misconduct category 
 
COMPV CIPBV MARKM MISSP MORTA SANC TAXO 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
- 2.24 - - - - - 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
0.28 - 4.77 - - - - 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
2.96 1.65 5.13 59.52 0.47 2.10 2.45 
European Commission (EC) 
 
- - 2.32 - - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
2.75 0.37 0.91 - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
2.21 - - - 0.69 0.30 0.10 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
- - - 35.94 - - - 
Joint 
 
- - 0.10 - 24.60 8.97 - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
- - - 1.96 - - - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 





COMPV CIPBV MARKM MISSP MORTA SANC TAXO 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
2.10 - - - 7.89 - - 
Private 
 
0.55 - 0.14 25.16 - - - 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
0.62 1.75 - 2.15 - - - 
Other   0.25 0.11 1.04 - - - 0.12 
         Panel C: Average amount                 
Agency/Misconduct category 
 
COMPV CIPBV MARKM MISSP MORTA SANC TAXO 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
- 0.45 - - - - - 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
0.28 - 0.30 - - - - 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
1.48 0.41 0.37 5.41 0.47 0.42 0.82 
European Commission (EC) 
 
- - 0.46 - - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
0.31 0.18 0.23 - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
0.28 - - - 0.23 0.15 0.10 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
- - - 1.89 - - - 
Joint 
 
- - 0.10 - 6.15 8.97 - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
- - - 0.39 - - - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
0.29 - 0.41 - - 0.34 0.72 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
0.35 - - - 1.58 - - 
Private 
 
0.55 - 0.14 1.57 - - - 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
0.21 0.29 - 0.24 - - - 
Other   0.12 0.11 0.35 - - - 0.12 
         Panel D: Maximum Amount                 
Agency/Misconduct category 
 
COMPV CIPBV MARKM MISSP MORTA SANC TAXO 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
- 0.75 - - - - - 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
0.28 - 0.80 - - - - 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
1.70 0.71 0.93 16.65 0.47 0.65 1.80 
European Commission (EC) 
 
- - 0.98 - - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
0.44 0.19 0.34 - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 





COMPV CIPBV MARKM MISSP MORTA SANC TAXO 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
- - - 10.35 - - - 
Joint 
 
- - 0.10 - 11.80 8.97 - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
- - - 1.10 - - - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
0.43 - 0.60 - - 0.61 0.72 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
0.50 - - - 2.89 - - 
Private 
 
0.55 - 0.14 8.50 - - - 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
0.27 0.42 - 0.55 - - - 
Other   0.14 0.19 0.49 - - - 0.12 
         
Panel E: Minimum Amount                 
Agency/Misconduct category 
 
COMPV CIPBV MARKM MISSP MORTA SANC TAXO 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
 
- - - - - - 0.12 
U.S Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
 
0.28 - 0.10 - - - - 
U.S Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 
1.26 0.23 0.09 0.16 0.47 0.23 0.10 
European Commission (EC) 
 
- - 0.13 - - - - 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
0.11 0.18 0.14 - - - - 
Federal Reserve (FED) 
 
0.17 - - - 0.13 0.10 0.10 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 
- - - 0.10 - - - 
Joint 
 
- - 0.10 - 2.20 8.97 - 
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
 
- - - 0.15 - - - 
New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) 
 
0.22 - 0.15 - - 0.10 0.72 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
 
0.25 - - - 0.25 - - 
Private 
 
0.55 - 0.14 0.18 - - - 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 
0.15 0.13 - 0.12 - - - 
Other   0.11 0.11 - - - - 0.12 
This table presents descriptive statistics of individual financial penalties per agency and misconduct type for the full sample. Panel A reports the number of events. Panel B reports 
the total amount. Panel C reports the average settlement. Panel D reports the maximum settlement. Panel E reports the minimum settlement. COMPV stands for Compliance 
Violation. CIPV stands for Consumer/Investor Protection Violation. MARKM stands for Market Manipulation. MISSP stands for Misseling Practices. MORTA stands for 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This table presents events included in the sample. First column reports the event date. Second column reports the bank. 
Third column reports the penalty for each event. Fourth column reports the misconduct category. Fifth column reports the 
agency imposing the financial penalty (see Appendix 4). COMPV stands for Compliance Violation. CIPV stands for 
Consumer/Investor Protection Violation. MARKM stands for Market Manipulation. MISSP stands for Misseling 
Practices. MORTA stands for Mortgage Abuses. SANC stands for Sanctions. TAXO stands for Tax Offences. VAR 




Cumulative abnormal returns following the resolution of litigation using Jaffe's (1974) 
approach. 
Panel A: Market model  
Observations 122 122 122 122 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 










     
Panel B: Two-index model 
Observations 122 122 122 122 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 










     
Panel C: Four-factor model 
Observations 122 122 122 122 
Window (0) (-1,1) (-1,0) (0,1) 










This table presents the CAARs for all banks following the portfolio approach of Jaffe (1974). Panel A reports the results 
based on the market model abnormal returns, Panel B shows the results based on the two-index model abnormal returns, 
and Panel C presents the results based on the four-factor model abnormal returns. Parameters for all models are estimated 
over a 250-day estimation window. Statistical significance of CAARs is assessed using the parametric test described in 




Descriptive statistics for different event window CARs. 












(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
0.09% 0.08% 0.17% 
 
0.014 0.014 0.013 
 
-3.27% -3.39% -2.83% 
 
4.69% 4.75% 4.23% 
 
2.146 2.331 1.046 
 
0.968 0.981 0.701 
0.12% 0.25% 0.37% 
 
0.022 0.021 0.019 
 
-2.83% -3.68% -3.34% 
 
7.81% 7.62% 7.92% 
 
0.686 1.122 1.852 
 
0.887 0.904 1.001 
0.15% 0.17% 0.25% 
 
0.017 0.017 0.016 
 
-3.51% -2.67% -4.37% 
 
5.58% 5.79% 4.53% 
 
0.148 0.265 0.386 
 
0.582 0.666 0.280 
0.15% 0.06% 0.35% 
 
0.019 0.018 0.017 
 
-3.71% -4.50% -4.26% 
 
8.27% 8.28% 7.62% 
 
2.872 3.067 3.418 
 
1.444 1.233 1.129 
                       












(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
0.21% 0.27% 0.10% 
 
0.012 0.012 0.013 
 
-3.27% -3.39% -2.83% 
 
3.36% 3.32% 3.97% 
 
1.953 1.442 0.516 
 
0.057 -0.233 0.462 
0.09% 0.34% 0.51% 
 
0.022 0.020 0.022 
 
-2.83% -3.68% -3.34% 
 
7.81% 7.54% 7.53% 
 
0.956 1.676 0.908 
 
0.939 0.810 0.749 
0.29% 0.19% 0.33% 
 
0.016 0.015 0.017 
 
-2.39% -2.56% -3.56% 
 
4.68% 4.56% 4.48% 
 
0.020 -0.191 -0.021 
 
0.456 0.420 0.248 
0.21% 0.18% 0.58% 
 
0.019 0.017 0.019 
 
-3.71% -4.50% -4.26% 
 
7.17% 6.71% 6.85% 
 
3.240 3.017 1.845 
 
1.520 0.780 0.684 
                       












(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
-0.02% -0.05% 0.17% 
 
0.015 0.015 0.012 
 
-2.66% -2.19% -2.63% 
 
4.69% 4.75% 4.23% 
 
1.932 2.437 1.668 
 
1.253 1.439 0.943 
0.15% 0.16% 0.27% 
 
0.022 0.022 0.017 
 
-2.81% -2.88% -2.86% 
 
7.54% 7.62% 7.92% 
 
0.580 0.903 3.222 
 
0.859 0.967 1.266 
0.09% 0.07% 0.18% 
 
0.018 0.018 0.015 
 
-3.51% -2.67% -4.37% 
 
5.58% 5.79% 4.53% 
 
0.227 0.487 0.897 
 
0.673 0.812 0.290 
0.09% 0.00% 0.31% 
 
0.019 0.019 0.015 
 
-2.48% -2.43% -1.76% 
 
8.27% 8.28% 7.62% 
 
2.856 3.143 6.085 
 
1.413 1.498 1.816 
This table presents descriptive statistics on individual financial penalties, aggregate financial penalties and for all variables used in the cross-sectional regression analysis. Panel A 
has 141 observations. Panel B has 61 observations. Panel C has 80 observations. (1), (2) and (3) denote the market model, two-index model and four-factor model, respectively. 
The third row of each panel contains statistics for the window (0), the fourth for the window (-1,1), the fifth for the window (-1,0), and the sixth for the window (0,1). I report the 





Multivariate analysis of the effect of the entity imposing the penalty on the (-1, 1) market model CARs. 
  Panel A: OLS Robust S.E.  
 
Panel B: WLS Robust S.E.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DOJ -0.004 
       
0.000 
      FHFA 
 
-0.013** 
       
-0.012** 
     JOINT 
  
0.003 
       
-0.002 
    NYDFS 
   
0.003 
       
0.006 
   OTHER 
    
0.002 
       
0.005 
  PRIVATE 
     
0.005 
       
0.009* 
 SEC             0.004               -0.001 
This table presents the results of regressing the (-1, 1) market model CARs on a set of bank characteristics and agency type dummy variables. Panel A presents the results using as 
estimation method OLS with robust standard errors, while for panel B WLS with robust standard errors is used. Each model includes the dummy variable corresponding to the 
agency type of each event. Only agencies with more than 10 events constitute dummy variables, all the remaining agencies are included in the “Other” category. Whenever there is 
more than one settlement with different agencies in the same day for the same bank, the “Joint” category is applied. Model (1) considers settlements agreed with the U.S. 
Department of Justice. Model (2) considers settlements reached with the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Model (3) considers settlements reached with several entities. Model (4) 
considers settlements reached with the New York Department of Financial Services. Model (5) considers settlements with other agencies (see Appendix 5). Model (6) considers 
settlements reached with private parties. Model (7) considers settlements with the Securities and Exchange Commission. All variables from the baseline regression are included in 








Multivariate analysis of the effect of the entity imposing the penalty on the (-1, 1) two-index model CARs. 
  Panel A: OLS Robust S.E.  
 
Panel B: WLS Robust S.E.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DOJ -0.003 
       
0.001 
      FHFA 
 
-0.014** 
       
-0.013*** 
     JOINT 
  
0.002 
       
-0.001 
    NYDFS 
   
0.004 
       
0.005 
   OTHER 
    
0.003 
       
0.004 
  PRIVATE 
     
0.003 
       
0.009** 
 SEC             0.004               -0.002 
This table presents the results of regressing the (-1, 1) two-index model CARs on a set of bank characteristics and agency type dummy variables. Panel A presents the results using 
as estimation method OLS with robust standard errors, while for panel B WLS with robust standard errors is used. Each model includes the dummy variable corresponding to the 
agency type of each event. Only agencies with more than 10 events constitute dummy variables, all the remaining agencies are included in the “Other” category. Whenever there is 
more than one settlement with different agencies in the same day for the same bank, the “Joint” category is applied. Model (1) considers settlements agreed with the U.S. 
Department of Justice. Model (2) considers settlements reached with the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Model (3) considers settlements reached with several entities. Model (4) 
considers settlements reached with the New York Department of Financial Services. Model (5) considers settlements with other agencies (see Appendix 5). Model (6) considers 
settlements reached with private parties. Model (7) considers settlements with the Securities and Exchange Commission. All variables from the baseline regression are included in 








Multivariate analysis of the effect of the entity imposing the penalty on the (-1, 1) four-factor model CARs. 
  Panel A: OLS Robust S.E.  
 
Panel B: WLS Robust S.E.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DOJ -0.072 
       
-0.004 
      FHFA 
 
-0.009** 
       
-0.010*** 
     JOINT 
  
0.000 
       
-0.004 
    NYDFS 
   
0.011 
       
0.013 
   OTHER 
    
0.003 
       
0.005 
  PRIVATE 
     
0.013*** 
       
0.012*** 
 SEC             0.002               -0.001 
This table presents the results of regressing the (-1, 1) four-factor model CARs on a set of bank characteristics and agency type dummy variables. Panel A presents the results using 
as estimation method OLS with robust standard errors, while for panel B WLS with robust standard errors is used. Each model includes the dummy variable corresponding to the 
agency type of each event. Only agencies with more than 10 events constitute dummy variables, all the remaining agencies are included in the “Other” category. Whenever there is 
more than one settlement with different agencies in the same day for the same bank, the “Joint” category is applied. Model (1) considers settlements agreed with the U.S. 
Department of Justice. Model (2) considers settlements reached with the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Model (3) considers settlements reached with several entities. Model (4) 
considers settlements reached with the New York Department of Financial Services. Model (5) considers settlements with other agencies (see Appendix 5). Model (6) considers 
settlements reached with private parties. Model (7) considers settlements with the Securities and Exchange Commission. All variables from the baseline regression are included in 








Multivariate analysis of the effect of misconduct type on the (-1, 1) market model CARs. 
  Panel A: OLS Robust S.E.  
 
Panel B: WLS Robust S.E.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COMPV -0.003 
        
-0.001 
       CIPV 
 
-0.003 
        
-0.004 
      MARKM 
  
0.006 
        
0.005 
     MISSP 
   
-0.003 
        
-0.002 
    MORTA 
    
0.009** 
        
0.008** 
   SANC 
     
0.010 
        
0.018* 
  TAXO 
      
-0.001 




       
-0.008 
        
-0.009 
This table presents the results of regressing the (-1, 1) market model CARs on a set of bank characteristics and misconduct type dummy variables. Panel A presents the results using 
as estimation method OLS with robust standard errors, while for panel B WLS with robust standard errors is used. Each model includes the dummy variable corresponding to the 
misconduct type of each event. Only agencies with more than 10 events constitute dummy variables, all the remaining agencies are included in the “Other” category. Whenever 
there is more than one settlement with different categories in the same day for the same bank, the “Varied” category is applied. Model (1) considers misconduct categorized as 
“Compliance Violation”. Model (2) considers misconduct categorized as “Consumer/Investor Protection Violation”. Model (3) considers misconduct categorized as “Market 
Manipulation”. Model (4) considers misconduct categorized as “Misseling Practices”. Model (5) considers misconduct categorized as “Mortgage Abuses”. Model (6) considers 
misconduct categorized as “Sanctions Violations”. Model (7) considers misconduct categorized as “Tax Offences”.  Model (8) considers events with more than one misconduct 
type in the same day. All variables from the baseline regression are included in all models, including dummy variables that control for the year of each observation. Statistical 







Multivariate analysis of the effect of misconduct type on the (-1, 1) two-index model CARs. 
  Panel A: OLS Robust S.E.  
 
Panel B: WLS Robust S.E.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COMPV -0.004 
        
0.000 
       CIPV 
 
-0.001 
        
-0.002 
      MARKM 
  
0.002 
        
-0.001 
     MISSP 
   
-0.004 
        
-0.002 
    MORTA 
    
0.010*** 
        
0.009*** 
   SANC 
     
0.011 
        
0.018* 
  TAXO 
      
-0.005 




       
-0.004 
        
-0.005 
This table presents the results of regressing the (-1, 1) two-index model CARs on a set of bank characteristics and misconduct type dummy variables. Panel A presents the results 
using as estimation method OLS with robust standard errors, while for panel B WLS with robust standard errors is used. Each model includes the dummy variable corresponding to 
the misconduct type of each event. Only agencies with more than 10 events constitute dummy variables , all the remaining agencies are included in the “Other” category. Whenever 
there is more than one settlement with different categories in the same day for the same bank, the “Varied” category is applied. Model (1) considers misconduct categorized as 
“Compliance Violation”. Model (2) considers misconduct categorized as “Consumer/Investor Protection Violation”. Model (3) considers misconduct categorized as “Market 
Manipulation”. Model (4) considers misconduct categorized as “Misseling Practices”. Model (5) considers misconduct categorized as “Mortgage Abuses”. Model (6) considers 
misconduct categorized as “Sanctions Violations”. Model (7) considers misconduct categorized as “Tax Offences”.  Model (8) considers events with more than one misconduct 
type in the same day. All variables from the baseline regression are included in all models, including dummy variables that control for the year of each observation. Statistical 







Multivariate analysis of the effect of misconduct type on the (-1, 1) four-factor model CARs. 
  Panel A: OLS Robust S.E.  
 
Panel B: WLS Robust S.E.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COMPV -0.001 
        
0.002 
       CIPV 
 
-0.008 
        
-0.004 
      MARKM 
  
0.001 
        
0.001 
     MISSP 
   
0.001 
        
-0.001 
    MORTA 
    
0.007 
        
0.005 
   SANC 
     
0.014 
        
0.022** 
  TAXO 
      
-0.011 




       
-0.004 
        
-0.007 
This table presents the results of regressing the (-1, 1) four-factor model CARs on a set of bank characteristics and misconduct type dummy variables. Panel A presents the results 
using as estimation method OLS with robust standard errors, while for panel B WLS with robust standard errors is used. Each model includes the dummy variable corresponding to 
the misconduct type of each event. Only agencies with more than 10 events constitute dummy variables, all the remaining agencies are included in the “Other” category. Whenever 
there is more than one settlement with different categories in the same day for the same bank, the “Varied” category is applied. Model (1) considers misconduct categorized as 
“Compliance Violation”. Model (2) considers misconduct categorized as “Consumer/Investor Protection Violation”. Model (3) considers misconduct categorized as “Market 
Manipulation”. Model (4) considers misconduct categorized as “Misseling Practices”. Model (5) considers misconduct categorized as “Mortgage Abuses”. Model (6) considers 
misconduct categorized as “Sanctions Violations”. Model (7) considers misconduct categorized as “Tax Offences”.  Model (8) considers events with more than one misconduct 
type in the same day. All variables from the baseline regression are included in all models, including dummy variables that control for the year  of each observation. Statistical 
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